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In the present paper we address the relationship between the ex t e n t
of business ow n e rship, or as we use interchangeably self-employ-
ment, and economic growth. Specifically, we will focus upon thre e
i s s u e s. First, how is the equilibrium rate of self-employment (busi-
ness  ow n e rship)  related  to  the  stage  of  economic  deve l o p m e n t ?
Second, what is the speed of conve rgence towa rds the equilibrium
rate when the rate of self-employment is out-of-equilibrium? Third ,
to what extent does deviating from the equilibrium rate of business
ow n e rship lead to less economic growth? Hypotheses concerning all
t h ree issues are used setting up a new two-equation model, while
also variables like the unemployment ra t e, labor income quote and
g ross domestic product play a ro l e. We find confirmation for the
hypothesized effects using a data panel of 23 OECD countries. An
important policy implication of our exe rcises is that free entry and
exit  of  self-employed/businesses  is  a  necessary condition  for  the
equilibrium seeking mechanisms that are vital for sound economic
d eve l o p m e n t .
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In the present paper we address the relationship between the ex t e n t
of  business  ow n e rship  (or  interchangeably  self-employment)  and
economic  growth.  Equilibrium  rates  of  self-employment  can  be
d e r i ved by making assumptions about (1) the aggregate pro d u c t i o n
function  combining  the  efforts  of  business  ow n e rs  and  wa g e -
e m p l oyed  individuals  and  (2)  their  rational  occupational  choice
b e t ween self- and wa g e - e m p l oyment. Differences in the assumptions
about the critical factors to choose self-employment lead to differe n t
equilibrium models. Two early contributions are Lucas (1978) and
K i h l s t rom and Laffont (1979). Lucas assumes individuals to have dif-
f e rent managerial abilities while Kihlstrom and Laffont assume indi-
viduals to differ with respect to their risk attitudes. Calvo and We l l i s z
(1980)  extend  Lucas’  model  by  introducing  a  learning  pro c e s s
t h rough which managers acquire the  necessary  know l e d g e.  More
recent contributions include Schmitz (1989), Holmes and Schmitz
(1990), De Wit and Van Winden (1991) and Gifford (1993). The equi-
librium rate of business ow n e rship depends upon the stage of eco-
nomic development. This may be due to changes in the aggre g a t e
p roduction function (e.g. scale economies) or the criteria of the occu-
pational choice (e.g. degree of risk ave rsion). Re c e n t l y, Iyigun and
O wen (1998) developed a model explicitly relating the equilibrium
rate of self-employment and the stage of economic development. The
variables self-employment and business ow n e rship are used sy n o ny-
mously  in  the  current  re s e a rch.  We  use  a  unified  international
dataset in  which  business ow n e rs  (self-employed) are defined as
individuals  owning a business  that is not legally incorporated or
owning an incorporated business from which they gain profits as
well as a salary.1
T h e re are various links between the rate of business ow n e rship and
economic performance. First, we suspect the existence of a long-term
relation between the rate of business ow n e rship and the stage of eco-
nomic development. Deviations from this ‘equilibrium’ should be
i n t e r p reted as misallocation and may lead to adaptations in the num-
ber of business ow n e rs as well as to lower growth leve l s. Second, low
g rowth levels may lead to high unemployment levels making self-
e m p l oyment more attra c t i ve providing an alternative at low oppor-
tunity costs. Low employment may induce people who have a hard
time finding work or whose care e rs are threatened within ex i s t i n g
companies to become self-employed. This leads to the reve rse effect
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1 For mo re details on these de f i n i t io ns, see Appendix I.that economic growth affects the rate of business ow n e rs per labor
f o rc e.
In short, we will focus upon three issues. First, how is the equilibri-
um  rate  of business  ow n e rship  related  to  the  stage  of  economic
d evelopment? Second, what is the speed of conve rgence towa rds the
equilibrium rate when the rate of business ow n e rship is out-of-equi-
librium? Third, to what extent does deviating from the equilibrium
rate  of  business  ow n e rship  lead  to  less  economic  performance
( g rowth)? All these hypotheses are used setting up a new two - e q u a-
tion model while also other variables like the unemployment ra t e,
labor income quote and gross domestic product play a ro l e. We find
confirmation for each of these effects using a data panel of 23 OECD
c o u n t r i e s.
S e l f - e m p l oyment has re c e i ved quite some attention from policy mak-
e rs in European countries. Despite a recent drop from about 11 to 10
p e rcent in the period 1996 through 1998, the persistently high unem-
p l oyment  level  is  the  main  economic  problem  in  the  Euro p e a n
Union. The high unemployment rate coupled with limited economic
g rowth in Europe has triggered a plea by policy make rs for re t h i n k-
ing the policy approach that ushered in European prosperity during
the post-war era. The twin forces of globalization have reduced the
ability of the European countries to generate economic growth and
c reate jobs. On the one hand has come the advent of new competi-
tion from low-cost countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as
Asia. On the other hand, the telecommunications and computer rev-
olutions have drastically reduced the cost of shifting not only capital
but also information out of the high-cost locations of Europe and into
l ower-cost locations around the globe. Ta ken together, these twin
f o rces of globalization mean that economic activity in a high-cost
location is no longer compatible with routinized large-scale opera-
t i o n s. 
H e n c e, in their efforts to create jobs, politicians turned to pro m o t i n g
l a b o r - i n t e n s i ve  and  small-scaled  org a n i z a t i o n s.  This  is  why  both
politicians and scientists have become interested in small businesses
recently: labor-intensive economic growth can be achieved by stim-
ulating the small business sector because generally small businesses
a re labor-intensive. Fu r t h e r m o re, entre p re n e u rship, in the form of
n ew  firms,  and  intra p re n e u rship,  in  the  form  of  new  ideas  and
responsibilities implemented in existing org a n i z a t i o n s, are essential
to creating new economic activity. In modern economies a great va r i-
ety of organizations is invo l ved in making innova t i ve pro d u c t s. This
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I n t r o d u c t i o nis the case particularly in niche markets like in the ICT sector. The
m o re organizations are active in such marke t s, the greater the chance
that an innovation takes place. Variety and selection play a dominant
role in this mechanism. 
It is deeply embedded in the current European policy approach that
c re a t i v i t y, autonomy and independence embedded in self-employ-
ment  contribute to  higher  levels  of economic  activity.  There f o re,
major funds  of  governmental  institutions and independent donor
o rganizations are being channelled towa rds young and small firms.
The present paper aims at judging whether such policies are justified
in all phases of economic deve l o p m e n t .
The present paper is set up as follows: in section two a survey is
g i ven of the empirical and theoretical litera t u re on the re l a t i o n s h i p
b e t ween business ow n e rship and growth. Also some definitional and
data questions are cove red. Our two-equation model is specified in
section three while section four deals with data and estimation tech-
n i q u e. In section five some extensions (the role of Italy) and alterna-
t i ve specifications (the penalty structure of an economy in ‘disequi-
librium’ and the shape of the long-term equilibrium relation betwe e n
the number of business ow n e rs and the stage of economic deve l o p-
ment) of the basic model are discussed. Conclusions are drawn in
section six.
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D e f i n i t i o n s
Our  study  focuses  on  the  number  of  business  ow n e rs  (self-
e m p l oyed),  although  occasionally  we  will  refer  to  entre p re n e u rs
despite the fact that these concepts are not sy n o ny m o u s. F i rs t, busi-
ness ow n e rs serve many roles and functions. Many re s e a rc h e rs dis-
tinguish between Schumpeterian (or real) entre p re n e u rs and man-
agerial  business  ow n e rs  (We n n e ke rs  and  Thurik  1999).1
E n t re p re n e u rs are a small fraction of the business ow n e rs. They ow n
and  direct  independent  firms  that  are  innova t i ve  and  ‘cre a t i ve l y
d e s t roy’  existing  market  structure s.  After  realizing  their  goals
Schumpeterian entre p re n e u rs often develop into managerial business
ow n e rs,  but  some  may  again  start  new  ve n t u res  or  new  firms.
Managerial business ow n e rs are to be found in the large majority of
small firms. They include many fra n c h i s e e s, shopke e p e rs and people
in professional occupations. They belong to what Kirchhoff (1996)
calls ‘the economic core ’. Occasionally entre p reneurial ve n t u res grow
out of them. In an empirical context it is difficult to discriminate
b e t ween  managerial business ow n e rs  and entre p re n e u rs.  For that
one would need profiles of individual business ow n e rs. More ove r,
the discrimination is a theoretical one since most business ow n e rs
a re neither pure ‘Schumpeterians’ nor pure ‘shopke e p e rs’ but share
the attitudes associated with these ex t remes in a varying degre e.
S e c o n d, entre p reneurial energy is not limited to self-employed indi-
v i d u a l s. Large  companies promote ‘intra p re n e u rship’  within  busi-
ness units to achieve more flexibility and innova t i veness (Stopford
and Baden-Fuller 1994). This broader interpretation of entre p re n e u r-
ship implies measurement difficulties. It is inconceivable howeve r
that a society in which entre p re n e u rship by self-employment thrive s
would not generate modern decentralized larger companies. In that
sense the rate of self-employment may be a fair indicator of a gener-
al  level  of  entre p re n e u rship  in  a  society,  at  least  in  modern
e c o n o m i e s. 
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1 In a similar fa s h ion Audretsch and Thurik (1998) distinguish between two types of self-
employed: the ‘re f u gee’ or ‘sho p keeper’ type and the ‘Schu m p e t e r ian’ type. In their ana l y s i s
of how and why ent re p re neurship has ma de important cont r i b u t io ns to econo m ic and socia l
life in mo dern indu s t r ialized count r ies they assume that these two types have differe nt eco-
no m ic roles in their re l a t ion with une m p l o y me nt. The number of ‘sho p keepers’ is likely to go
up if the level of unemployed rises and that same level is expected to go down if the nu m-
ber of ‘Schu m p e t e r ia ns’ inc re a s e s.E n t re p re n e u rship  remains  a  very  broad  concept  (We n n e ke rs  and
Thurik 1999), a challenging concept (Amit et al. 1993) and of con-
s i d e rable importance for a country’s competitive edge (Porter 1990)
and for the functioning and restructuring of marke t s. That is why
sometimes we will refer to entre p re n e u rship when discussing the
determinants of grow t h .
In this study we use data material of 23 OECD countries including
the  fifteen countries  of  the  EU-15, Iceland,  Norway,  Sw i t z e r l a n d ,
Canada, Au s t ralia, New Zealand, Japan and the U.S. for the period
1974 through 1994. We define the number of self-employed or busi-
ness ow n e rs as including ow n e r - m a n a g e rs of legally incorpora t e d
businesses for the whole economy excluding the agricultural sector.
See appendix I to this paper for more details.
The impact of economic pro g ress on business ow n e rs h i p
The proportion of the labor force that is self-employed has decre a s e d
in most Western countries until the mid-1970 s. Since then the self-
e m p l oyment  rate  has  started  to  rise  again  in  seve ral  of  these
e c o n o m i e s. Blau (1987) observes that the proportions of both male
and  female  self-employed  in  the  nonagricultural  U.S.  labor  forc e
declined  during  most of  this  century.  He  also  observes  that  this
decline bottomed out in the early 1970s and started to rise until at
least 1982. The data used in this report show that the self-employ-
ment rate in the U.S. has continued to rise gradually since then. More
recently business ow n e rship increased in seve ral other countries like
Canada, the U.K., Spain, the Netherlands and Au s t ralia. In this sec-
tion we present some empirical evidence and discuss the main re a-
sons  for  a  structural  or  long-term  relationship  between  the  self-
e m p l oyment rate and economic deve l o p m e n t .
Negative re l a t i o n s h i p
A negative relationship between the self-employment rate and eco-
nomic development was already reported by Kuznets (1971) describ-
ing the shift in locus of production from family to firm. A negative
c o r relation  of  –0.85  between  real  per  capita  GDP  and  the  self-
e m p l oyment share is found in Yamada (1996). Schultz reports that ‘a
1% annual rate of growth in real income per adult is associated with
about the same increase in the share of wage earners for men and
women,  0.15%  and 0.16%,  re s p e c t i ve l y.’ (Schultz  1990,  p.  475).
These studies use a large cross-section of countries with a wide va r i-
ety in the stage of economic development. Bregger (1996) reports a
decline of the U.S. self-employment for all industries from 18.5% in
1948 until 8.7% in 1975. The decline is less vehement when agri-
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T h e o r yc u l t u re is excluded: from 12.0% in 1948 to 6.9% in 1975. This re d u c-
tion in the rate of self-employment is re p re s e n t a t i ve for that in many
Western countries during the most part of this century. 
T h e re are many reasons for the decline of self-employment, and of
small business presence in general. Lucas (1978) shows how rising
real wages may raise the opportunity cost of self-employment re l a-
t i ve to the return. Given an underlying distribution of persons by
‘managerial’ talent this induces marginal entre p re n e u rs (in this con-
t ext Lucas re f e rs to managers) to become employe e s. This pushes up
the ave rage size of firms. Chandler (1990) stresses the importance of
i n vestment in production, distribution, and management needed to
exploit economies of scale and scope during the period after the sec-
ond industrial revolution of the second half of the 19th century. It
was a period of re l a t i vely well-defined technological tra j e c t o r i e s, of a
stable demand and of seemingly clear advantages of dive rs i f i c a t i o n .
Au d retsch and Thurik (1997) characterize this period as one where
s t a b i l i t y,  continuity  and  homogeneity  we re  the  cornerstones  and
label it the managed economy. Schaffner (1993) takes a somew h a t
d i f f e rent and more theoretical approach. She points out that ‘over the
c o u rse of economic development the advantages firm ow n e rs derive
f rom being less risk ave rse (better dive rsified) than self-employe d
p ro d u c e rs are likely to rise re l a t i ve to the disadvantages caused by
the costliness of circ u m venting asymmetric information pro b l e m s.’
(p. 435). Iyigun and Owen (1998) develop a model implying that eco-
nomic development is associated with a decline in the number of
e n t re p re n e u rs re l a t i ve to the total number of employe e s. They arg u e
that fewer individuals are willing to risk becoming an entre p re n e u r
as the ‘safe’ professional earnings rise with economic deve l o p m e n t .
See  also  Kihlstrom  and  Laffont  (1979),  Blanchflower  and  Meye r
(1994) and Blanchflower and Oswald (1998). Other explanations are
f rom Galbraith (1956) who considered the increase in market con-
c e n t ration to be a consequence of ‘countervailing power’ and Cohen
and Klepper (1996) who see important scale advantages in R&D.
Re v e rsal of the tre n d
S eve ral authors provide evidence of the reve rsal of the trend towa rd s
less self-employment. Acs et al. (1994) report that of 23 OECD-coun-
t r i e s, 15 experienced an increase in the self-employment rate during
the 1970s and 1980s. They show that the weighted ave rage of the
s e l f - e m p l oyment rate in OECD-countries rose slightly from 8.4% in
1978 to 8.9% in 1987. Closely related to the development of the self-
e m p l oyment rate is the development of small business presence in
g e n e ral. Carlsson (1989) provides data on the share of the Fo r t u n e
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T h e o r y500 companies in total manufacturing. He shows that this share in
total manufacturing employment dropped from 78.7% in 1975 to
72.5% in 1985. In the same period the share of these firms in total
shipments dropped from 83.2% to 77.2%. Other sources show i n g
that the growing importance of large business has come to a halt in
Western countries include Loveman and Sengenberger (1991), Ac s
and Au d retsch (1993) and Ac s, Carlson and Thurik (1996).1
T h e re are seve ral reasons for the more prominent place of small busi-
ness and self-employment in Western economies. F i rs t, the last 25
ye a rs of the 20th century may be seen as a period of cre a t i ve destruc-
tion, as described in Schumpeter (1950). Piore and Sabel (1984) use
the  term  Industrial  Divide,  Jensen  (1993)  pre f e rs  the  term  Third
Industrial Revolution, while Freeman and Pe rez (1988) talk about the
t ransition from the fourth to the fifth Ko n d ra t i ev wave. Au d re t s c h
and Thurik (1997 and 1998) stress the effects of globalization and the
information  revolution  leading  to  the  demise  of  the  compara t i ve
a d vantage of Europe in many of the traditional industries, such as
machine tools, metalworking, textiles and automobile pro d u c t i o n .
The most obvious evidence is the emergence of new industries like
the  softwa re  and  biotechnology  industries.  Small  firms  play  an
important role in these new industries. Acs and Au d retsch (1987)
p rovide empirical evidence that small firms have a re l a t i ve innova-
t i ve advantage over their larger counterparts in such highly innova-
t i ve  industries.  Evidence  for  the  compara t i ve  advantage of  small
firms in inventing radically new products is also given in Prusa and
Schmitz (1991), and Ro t h well (1983, 1984).
S e c o n d,  new  technologies  have  reduced  the  importance  of  scale
economies in many sectors and small technology-based firms started
to challenge large companies that still had every confidence in mass
p roduction techniques (Carlsson 1989). Meredith (1987) argues that
small firms are just as well, or better, equipped to implement tech-
nological advances and predicts the factory of the future to be a small
f a c t o r y. Jensen argues that ‘It is far less valuable for people to be in
the same geographical location to work together effective l y, and this
is  encouraging  smaller,  more  efficient,  entre p reneurial  org a n i z i n g
units that cooperate through technology’ (Jensen 1993, p. 842). This
is supported by Jova n ovic saying that: ‘recent advances in informa-
tion technology have made market-based coordination cheaper re l a-
t i ve to internal coordination and have partially caused the re c e n t
decline in firm size and dive rsification’ (Jova n ovic 1993, p. 221 ) .
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1 See also the various editio ns of The European Observatory for SMEs  w h ich pro v ide an account
of the state of small business in Euro p e, for ins t a nce EIM (1997).O t h e rs, like Ro t h well (1983, 1984), stress that large and small firms
complement and succeed each other in the innovation and diffusion
p ro c e s s. His theory is one of ‘dynamic complementarity’. See also
Nooteboom (1994).
T h i rd, the increasing incomes and wealth have enabled individuals
to consider ‘higher’ needs. As a result the demand for variety incre a s-
es (Jackson 1984). Cro s s - c u l t u ral influences have also enlarged the
demand for va r i e t y. Small firms are often the most obvious suppliers
of new and specialized pro d u c t s. The decrease in dive rsification as
reported by Jova n ovic (1993) suggests that large firms have not been
capable of entering into such market niches.
Fo u r t h,  deregulation  movements  have  swept  the  world.  Phillips
(1985) reports that small firms have dominated in both the cre a t i o n
of new businesses and new jobs in deregulated industry sectors in
the U.S. in the early 1980s. This confirms some preliminary empiri-
cal evidence as provided by Shepherd (1982). Governments have
also begun to acknowledge and promote the vital role by small (start-
up)  firms  in  achieving  economic  growth  and  development.  See
S t o rey and Tether (1998), OECD (1998) and EIM (1994 and 1996).
F i f t h, there has been a tendency of large firms to concentrate on ‘core
competences’  (Carlsson  1989).  Jova n ovic  (1993)  reports  that  the
1980s  we re  characterized  by  corporate  spin-offs  and  dive s t m e n t .
Aiginger and Tichy (1991) blame much of the ‘back-to-basics’ and
d ownsizing  (or  rightsizing)  tendencies  on  the  opportunistic  con-
g l o m e rate merger wave of the late 1960s.1
S i x t h,  self-employment  is  more highly valued  as an occupational
choice than before. Roughly one out of four young U.S. wo r ke rs pur-
sue  self-employment  according  to  Schiller  and  Crewson  (1997).
K i rchhoff (1996) argues that self-employment is not any m o re char-
acterized as  under-employment  or  being  mom-and-pop establish-
m e n t s, but as a way to achieve a variety of personal goals. Baumol
(1990) stressed the importance of entre p re n e u rship being led into
p ro d u c t i ve  channels.  Also,  as  hypothesized  in  social  psyc h o l o g y
t h e re is a Maslowian hiera rc hy of human motiva t i o n s, with phys i c a l
needs at the bottom and self-realization at the top (Maslow 1970). A
higher level of prosperity will induce a higher need for self-re a l i z a-
tion and there by may stimulate entre p re n e u rs h i p .
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1 See also The Economist, Jan. 9th 1999, How to ma ke me rgers work (pp. 13-14) and How to
me rge: after the deal (pp. 19-21).F i n a l l y, the employment share of the services sector has been we l l
documented  (Inman,  1985)  to  increase  with  per  capita  income.
G i ven the re l a t i vely small ave rage firm size of most services (barring
a i r l i n e s, shipping and some business services) this creates more pos-
sibilities for self-employment (EIM 1997).
O b v i o u s l y, some of these factors may have had a temporary effect
o n l y. For exa m p l e, it is not unlikely for the ‘back to core business’,
o u t s o u rcing and deregulation waves to dry up.1 On the other hand,
t h e re are more permanent effects like that of new technologies. We
refer again to Freeman and Pe rez (1988). They claim that in the new
techno-economic paradigm (fifth Ko n d ra t i ev wave) the org a n i z a t i o n
of firms will be ‘networks’ of large and small firms. See also Oughton
and Whittam (1997) who emphasize the role of external economies
of scale when explaining the viability of small firms. Small firms will
p rofit from the new model of flexible specialization (Piore and Sabel
1984 and Fiegenbaum and Karnani 1991). More ove r, the intro d u c t i o n
of new technologies is also positively related to the stage of economic
d evelopment through necessary skills and other inve s t m e n t s. Finally,
the increasing variety of demand for specialized goods and services,
the increased valuation of self-realization and the rise of the services
sector are also dependent on per capita income.
An equilibrium rate of business owners h i p
As the extent to which there is a reve rsal of the trend towa rds less
s e l f - e m p l oyment is still not quite clear we hypothesize a re l a t i o n s h i p
b e t ween the rate of business ow n e rship and per capita income that
is either L-shaped or U-shaped2. In case of an L-shape it is assumed
that the equilibrium business ow n e rship rate continues to decline
with the stage of economic development while in case of a U-shaped
c u r ve it is assumed that this trend is reve rsed at higher levels of
d evelopment. The U-shaped pattern has the advantage that it allows
the establishment of a level of economic development with a ‘mini-
mum’ business ow n e rship ra t e.
The secular trend is best viewed as a long-term equilibrium rate of
business  ow n e rship  resulting  from  technological  conditions,  the
demand for goods and services and the supply of potential entre p re-
n e u rs. The theoretical viability of an equilibrium rate of self-employ-
ment is corro b o rated by De Wit and Van Winden (1991) using an m-
s e c t o r, n-group general equilibrium model of self-employment. In
this model seve ral of the above determinants are used to determine
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1 S e e The Economist, June 24th 1995, Big is back (survey).
2 S c hultz (1990) reports having fo u nd statistical evide nce for a qua dra t ic re l a t io nship between
t he share of wage earners and the stage of econo m ic de v e l o p me nt .the equilibrium rate of self-employment. Schmitz (1989) derives the
equilibrium fraction of the self-employed in an endogenous grow t h
model. Gifford (1992, 1993 and 1998) develops a model of entre p re-
neurial attention between maintaining current activities and starting
n ew ones. She derives the proportion of agents choosing a career as
i n n ova t i ve  entre p re n e u r,  managerial  entre p reneur  and  salaried
e m p l oye e. See also Holmes and Schmitz (1990).
H oweve r, many forces may cause the actual number of self-employe d
(business ow n e rs) to differ from the long-term equilibrium ra t e. Such
a  ‘disequilibrium’  (i.e. deviation from the  long-term  equilibrium)
m ay stem from cultural forc e s, institutional settings (regulation of
e n t r y, incentive structure s, functioning of the capital market) and
economic forces (unemployment, profitability of private enterprise).
See Kirzner (1997), Davis and Henrekson (1999) and Henrekson and
Johansson (1999).
In a market economy there will be underlying endogenous move-
ments  to  re s t o re  equilibrium.  Some  examples  may  illustrate  this
point.  A  structurally  low  number  of  enterprises  such  as  many
Western economies experienced in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
has undoubtedly contributed to structural unemployment. A positive
influence of unemployment on self-employment has already been
d e m o n s t rated by seve ral authors such as Storey (1991), Evans and
Leighton (1989) and Au d retsch and Thurik (1998). Alba-Ra m i re z
(1994) shows that for both Spain and the U.S. the duration of unem-
p l oyment increases the probability of becoming self-employed. His
a n a l ysis suggests that the effect of unemployment duration on the
p robability of becoming self-employed is not very different for the
t wo countries, albeit stronger for the U.S. The results are intere s t i n g
especially since the Spanish economy has a higher degree of unem-
p l oyment and self-employment when compared to the American.
The results suggest that the influence of unemployment on business
ow n e rship is a common feature across economies.1 G radually high
u n e m p l oyment also results in wage moderation helping to re s t o re
p rofitability of private enterprise. The effect of profitability on self-
e m p l oyment  was  shown  by  Wildeman  et  al.  (1998).  Finally,  we
assume that a shortage of business ow n e rship induces many policies
fostering entre p re n e u rship, ranging from a lower replacement ratio to
better  access  to  financing  and  competition  policies.  See  OECD
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1 A l b a - R a m i rez (1994) also notes that legislation aimed to help the jobless start up their own
b u s i ness has been impleme nted across developed count r ies and gives the example of the
Spanish 1985 law pro v id i ng lump-sum une m p l o y me nt ins u ra nce to workers willing to become
s e l f - e m p l o y e d.(1998). These processes are hard to observe and may there f o re be
modelled best using an error correction mechanism. Likewise a num-
ber of business ow n e rs which structurally exceeds the equilibrium
rate may be expected to diminish pro f i t a b i l i t y, resulting in higher ex i t
( f a i l u re rates) and lower entry, and to induce policies and pra c t i c e s
restricting entry.
The effect of business ow n e rship on economic pro g re s s
T h e re is some evidence on the relation between size class distribu-
tions and economic performance. For instance, see Nickell (1996),
N i c kell et al. (1997) and Lever and Nieuwenhuijsen (1999) who pre-
sent evidence that competition, as measured by increased number of
c o m p e t i t o rs, has a positive effect on the rate of total factor pro d u c-
tivity grow t h .1 C a r ree and Thurik (1998, 1999) show that the share
of small firms in manufacturing industries in European countries has
a positive effect on the industry output growth. Thurik (1996) re p o r t s
that the excess growth of small firms2 has had a positive influence
on percentage change in gross national product for a sample of 16
E u ropean countries in the period 1988 through 1993. Au d retsch and
Thurik (1999) show that self-employment brings down unemploy-
ment for a sample of 23 OECD countries.3
A theoretical endogenous growth model was developed by Schmitz
(1989). His model predicts that an increase of the proportion of entre-
p re n e u rs in the working force leads to an increase in long-run eco-
nomic growth. See also Holmes and Schmitz (1990) who develop a
model of entre p re n e u rship in the spirit of T. W. Schultz. They show
h ow  specialization  in  managerial  tasks  and  entre p re n e u rs h i p
– responding to opportunities for creating new products and pro d u c-
tion processes – may affect economic development. Finally, some ev i-
dence  of  a  well-established  historical  (long-term)  re l a t i o n s h i p
b e t ween  fluctuations  in  entre p re n e u rship  and  the  rise and fall  of
nations has been assembled by We n n e ke rs and Thurik (1999). In this
respect also the work of Eliasson (1995) on economic growth thro u g h
c o m p e t i t i ve selection is of re l eva n c e.
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1 Acs et al. (1999) point at differe nces in competition and ent re p re neurship when comparing
t he mo re successful U.S. econo my to that of Europe and Ja p a n .
2 T he excess growth of small firms is de f i ned as the perc e nt a ge change in the value-of - s h i p-
me nts accounted for by small firms minus the perc e nt a ge change in the value-of - s h i p me nt s
a c c o u nted for by large firms.
3 A subset of small firms which are assumed to improve econo m ic perfo r ma nce are the so-called
New Te c h nology-Based Firms (NTBFs). Ma ny of the businesses can be fo u nd on Scie nce Pa r k s
of which the number in ma ny count r ies has inc reased stro ngly du r i ng the 1980s and 1990s.
S t o rey and Te t her (1998) show that most of the NTBFs are, in fact, small firms. They re p o r t
t he avera ge number of employees to be aro u nd 20 both in Fra nce and the U.K. The two coun-
t r ies were the first in Europe (in 1969) to establish scie nce parks (Cambridge Scie nce Park in
t he U.K. and Sophia Antipolis in Fra nce). They claim that Italy serves as an example of lag-
g i ng behind in the establishme nt of ‘advanced’ scie nce parks and relate this to the re l a t i v e-
ly low pro p o r t ion of university re s e a rch that is fina nced by the It a l ian private sector.Another source of evidence on the relation between self-employ m e n t
and  pro g ress  is  the  economic  history  of  the formerly  centra l i z e d
planned economies.  A  characteristic  of  these  economies  was  the
almost complete absence of small firms (and private ow n e rship of
the means of production), and this ex t reme monopolization consti-
tuted one of the major factors leading to the collapse of state social-
ism (Acs 1996). The development of small enterprises is considere d
a vital part of the current transition process in Eastern Euro p e.1
F i n a l l y, we assume that deviations between the actual and the equi-
librium rate of business ow n e rship will diminish the growth poten-
tial of an economy in the short and medium term.2 A shortage of
business ow n e rs will diminish competition with detrimental effects
for static efficiency and competitiveness of the national economy.
Wo rse still, it will also diminish va r i e t y, learning and selection and
t h e re by harm dynamic efficiency (innovation). On the other hand, a
glut of self-employment will cause the ave rage scale of operations to
remain below optimum. More ove r, it will result in large numbers of
m a rginal entre p re n e u rs, absorbing capital and human energy that
could have been allocated more pro d u c t i vely elsew h e re.
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1 See for example Russia’s Shatalin Plan, which ‘is built on the assumption that society ne e d s
s mall enterprises to orie nt pro duc t ion to the needs of every person, to fig ht the dic t a t o r s h i p
of mo no p o l ies in cons u mer and pro duc t ion ma r ke t s, and to create a fa v o u rable enviro n me nt
for quick int ro duc t ion of new scie nt i f ic and techno l o g ical ideas’ (Nolan (1995), p. 82).
2 Iy igun and Owen (1998) show in a dy na m ic mo del with two types of hu man capital (prof e s-
s io nal and ent re p re ne u r ial) that a misallocation of the ex i s t i ng hu man capital stock between
p rof e s s io nal and ent re p re ne u r ial activities may occur. The na t u re of the ine f f ic ie nc y, ho w e v-
e r, is not clear-cut. The re may be too much ent re p re neurship or too little, de p e nd i ng on ho w
e nt re p re ne u r ial and prof e s s io nal skills contribute to the level of techno l o g y. They find that ‘a
mo re effic ie nt ra t io of prof e s s io nal and ent re p re ne u r ial skills will raise the steady state of
t e c h no l o g y, the wages paid to hu man capital pro v ide r s, and the re fo re, the econo my’s hu ma n
capital stock (p. 457). The re fo re, their mo del supports our no t ion that de v ia t io ns from the
level of optimal relative ent re p re ne u r ial activity come at a cost of lower econo m ic perfo r-
ma nc e.3 M o d e l
3 . 1 Two equations
Our main re s e a rch object is to find evidence for the impact of busi-
ness ow n e rship on economic growth at the macro level. Inve s t i g a t i n g
this influence cannot be carried out in the fra m ework of a single-
equation re g ression explaining economic growth. There are impor-
tant  feedback  relations  of  economic  growth  influencing  business
ow n e rship. A single-equation re g ression might then result in biased
e s t i m a t i o n s. There f o re, we introduce a model that consists of two
e q u a t i o n s. The first equation deals with the c a u s e s of business ow n-
e rship whereas the second deals with its c o n s e q u e n c e s.
3 . 2 Description of the model
The model reads as follows :1
( 1 a )
( 1 b )
( 1 c )
w h e re  E : number of business ow n e rs per labor forc e,
E * : equilibrium number of business ow n e rs per labor 
f o rc e,
Y: g ross domestic product in purchasing power pari-
ties per U.S. $ in 1990 prices,
Y / C A P :per  capita  gross  domestic  product  in  thousands 
p u rchasing  power  parities  per  U.S.  $  in  1990 
p r i c e s,
U : u n e m p l oyment ra t e,
U: sample ave rage of unemployment ra t e,
L I Q : labor income quote,
L I Q: sample ave rage of labor income quote,
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1 Next to the levels of une m p l o y me nt U and the labor inc o me quote LIQ, we have also cons id-
e red the relative mutations of these variables as possible ex p l a natory variables in (1a).
Ho w e v e r, estima t io ns point out that the corre s p o nd i ng para meters are not sig n i f ic a ntly dif-
f e re nt from zero and the re fo re we do not cons ider these relative mu t a t ion variables in the
p re s e nt re p o r t .e1, e2: disturbances of (1a) and (1b), re s p e c t i vely (possi-
bly corre l a t e d ) ,
i, t indices for country and time (in ye a rs), re s p e c t i ve -
l y.
Business ow n e rship equation
In equation 1a, the variable to be explained is the growth in the
number of business ow n e rs per labor force in a period of four ye a rs.
As a first explanatory variable we use lagged unemployment acting
as a push factor for business ow n e rship. The expected sign of the
p a rameter b1 is positive. We choose a lag for this variable because
p ractical pro c e d u res and legal re q u i rements are invo l ved in starting
a new enterprise. Fu r t h e r m o re, setting up a business may re q u i re a
c o n s i d e rable period of mental pre p a ration, particularly if (the thre a t
of) unemployment is the main motive.
As a second explanatory variable we apply the labor income quote.
This  variable  is  a  pragmatic  proxy  for  the  earning  differe n t i a l s
b e t ween expected profits of business ow n e rs and wage earnings. We
assume that a re l a t i vely high business profitability (as compared to
wage earnings) acts as a pull factor for business ow n e rship. The
labor income quote is defined as the share of labor income (includ-
ing the ‘calculated’ compensation of the self-employed for their labor
contribution) in the net national income. The expected sign of the
p a rameter b2 is negative. As with the unemployment va r i a b l e, a lag
has been included.
E r ror correction mechanism
The third explanatory variable in equation 1a, which has the para-
meter b0 assigned to it, is an error correction variable describing the
d i f f e rence between the equilibrium and the actual rate of business
ow n e rship. The parameter b0 is expected to have a positive sign. In
the basic ve rsion of our model the equilibrium function is U-shaped
with respect to per capita income (equation 1c has a quadratic form).
B e l ow we will also consider an L-shaped functional shape. Because
the parabola should first drop and then rise (instead of the other way
a round) we expect the parameter g to be positive and the para m e t e r
b to be negative. Fu r t h e r m o re, since the re l a t i ve number of business
ow n e rs cannot be negative, the parameter a should be positive. Also,
the re l a t i ve number of business ow n e rs cannot be in excess of one.
T h u s, we expect the value of the parameter a to lie between zero and
o n e.
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In equation 1b, the variable to be explained is economic growth in a
f o u r - year period, measured as the re l a t i ve change in gross domestic
p roduct (implemented as a log-difference). The first determinant of
g rowth  is  the  squared  deviation  of  the  actual  number  of  self-
e m p l oyed (business ow n e rs) from the equilibrium rate of business
ow n e rship. As explained in a previous section, the deviation va r i a b l e
is expected to have a negative impact on growth. Below we will con-
sider an alternative penalty function based on the absolute instead of
the squared dev i a t i o n .
N ext to this deviation va r i a b l e, which is the most important va r i a b l e
concerning  the  impact of business ow n e rship  on  growth,  contro l
variables such as lagged growth and the level of per capita income
a re taken into account. Using this last variable we capture the con-
ve rgence hypothesis of countries: countries which are lagging behind
in economic development can grow more easily than other countries
because they can profit from modern technologies developed in other
c o u n t r i e s. The expected sign of the parameter c2 is negative. 
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We use data material of 23 OECD countries including the fifteen
countries  of  the  EU-15,  Au s t ralia,  Canada,  Iceland,  Japan,  New
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the U.S. and for the period 1974
t h rough 1994. Data are available for the even ye a rs only. The main
data  sources  are  the OECD  Labor Fo rce  Statistics  and the  OECD
National Ac c o u n t s. A detailed description of the variable definitions
can be found in appendix I to this paper. In table 1 the values are
g i ven of four variables in the middle year of our sample, 1984, for all
c o u n t r i e s. 
Table 1 1984 values of some varia b l e s
S e l f - G D P Une m p l o y - Labor inc o me 
C o u nt r y e m p l o y me nt * per capita** me nt * q uo t e
Au s t r ia 0 . 0 5 3 1 4 , 3 5 1 0 . 0 4 5 0 . 8 4
Belgium  0 . 1 0 2 1 4 , 1 0 9 0 . 1 2 1 0 . 8 5
D e n ma r k 0 . 0 7 3 1 4 , 8 8 2 0 . 1 0 2 0 . 8 9
F i n l a nd 0 . 0 5 6 1 3 , 5 5 0 0 . 0 5 2 0 . 8 6
F ra nc e 0 . 0 9 6 1 5 , 0 0 6 0 . 0 9 7 0 . 8 8
G e r ma ny (We s t ) 0 . 0 6 7 1 5 , 7 6 1 0 . 0 7 1 0 . 8 3
G re e c e 0 . 1 7 7 6 , 7 4 7 0 . 0 4 2 1 . 0 3
I re l a nd 0 . 0 9 8 8 , 7 1 3 0 . 1 5 5 0 . 8 9
It a l y 0 . 1 6 5 1 3 , 5 9 9 0 . 0 9 4 0 . 8 3
L u xe m b o u rg 0 . 0 8 1 1 8 , 4 2 5 0 . 0 1 8 0 . 8 7
T he Ne t he r l a nd s 0 . 0 8 3 1 3 , 8 0 2 0 . 1 1 8 0 . 7 6
Po r t u g a l 0 . 1 2 0 7 , 0 0 9 0 . 0 8 4 0 . 7 6
S p a i n 0 . 1 5 0 9 , 3 5 9 0 . 1 9 7 0 . 8 4
S w e de n 0 . 0 6 6 1 5 , 3 0 4 0 . 0 3 1 0 . 8 5
United Kingdo m 0 . 0 8 7 1 3 , 2 4 9 0 . 1 1 7 0 . 8 5
Ic e l a nd 0 . 0 6 8 1 5 , 1 9 6 0 . 0 1 2 0 . 8 1
No r w a y 0 . 0 9 1 1 5 , 8 0 1 0 . 0 3 1 0 . 6 7
S w i t z e r l a nd 0 . 0 9 9 1 8 , 4 3 7 0 . 0 1 1 0 . 8 5
United States 0 . 1 0 2 1 9 , 6 6 2 0 . 0 7 4 0 . 8 3
Ja p a n 0 . 1 1 5 1 4 , 0 3 7 0 . 0 2 7 0 . 8 9
C a na da 0 . 0 8 6 1 6 , 4 3 9 0 . 1 1 2 0 . 7 8
Au s t ra l ia 0 . 1 3 6 1 4 , 6 8 4 0 . 0 8 9 0 . 8 3
New Ze a l a nd 0 . 1 3 1 1 3 , 3 3 9 0 . 0 5 0 0 . 7 6
Me a n 0 . 1 0 0 1 3 , 9 7 7 0 . 0 7 6 0 . 8 4
* Relative variable: per labor fo rc e.
* * Unity: purc h a s i ng power parities per U.S. $ at 1990 pric e s.
From table 1 we see that Gre e c e, Italy and Spain have the highest lev-
els of self-employment (business ow n e rship): more than 15% of the
labor forc e. The unweighed sample ave rage level of self-employ m e n t
in 1984 is 10%. The countries with the lowest levels of self-employ-
ment in 1984 are Austria, Finland, Germany, Sweden and Iceland:
less than seven percent of the labor forc e. Looking at the GDP per
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L u xe m b o u rg are the most affluent countries while Gre e c e, Ire l a n d ,
Portugal and Spain are the least affluent countries in the sample. The
u n e m p l oyment rates in 1984 are highest in Ireland and Spain: more
than 15% of the labor forc e. Low unemployment rates are found in
Japan,  Norway,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  Iceland  and  Luxe m b o u rg :
3.1% or lowe r. The ave rage unemployment rate in 1984 is 7.6%.
High values of the labor income quote are found in Denmark, Ire l a n d
and Japan. In these countries business profitability is re l a t i vely low
in comparison to ave rage wage earnings of an employe e. Countries
with a low labor income quote in1984 are the Netherlands, Po r t u g a l ,
N o r way, Canada and New Zealand: LIQ is below 0.80 (sample ave r-
age in 1984 is 0.84). A country that attracts attention is Greece with
a labor income quote of 1.03. This has to do with the way the LIQ is
calculated: self-employed persons obtain an imputed compensation
for their labor contribution set equal to the ave rage wage earnings
per employe e. This is done in order to distinguish business pro f i t s
f rom labor compensation for self-employed pers o n s. When the num-
ber of self-employed persons is high, the calculation becomes less
a c c u rate  since  the  imputed  part  of  ‘wage  earnings’  by  the  self-
e m p l oyed is higher. Since Greece has the highest self-employ m e n t
ra t e, this problem occurs for Greece in particular. Howeve r, we can
conclude that business profits are low in Greece: according to the LIQ
being in excess of one, the ave rage self-employed person has a lowe r
income than the ave rage employe e. 
Estimation technique
Since we estimate a model with two equations, we have to choose a
technique that deals with parameter restrictions across both equa-
t i o n s. For this purpose Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML)
is a suitable estimation technique. Model (1) is not an i n t r i n s i c a l l y
simultaneous model in the sense that both variables to be ex p l a i n e d
(in equations 1a and 1b) appear as an explanatory variable in the
other equation. Howeve r, since there are para m e t e rs re s t r i c t i o n s, we
estimate the model simultaneously (instead of estimating both equa-
tions separately) to obtain efficient parameter estimates. To avo i d
confusion, we shall characterize the model as a system of two equa-
tions and not as a simultaneous model.
When estimating the model, we weigh the observations with the
number of self-employed. We think that bigger countries such as the
U.S. and Japan are more important in establishing the re l a t i o n s h i p
b e t ween business ow n e rship and economic growth than small coun-
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call for a different relation, we would not want this to have a big
impact  on the model. A technical  description of  the weighing of
o b s e r vations can be found in appendix II to this paper.
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Data and estimation technique5 Extended  model  and  estima-
tion re s u l t s
The model presented in section 3 (equations 1a and 1b) should be
v i ewed as the basic specification of the model. Before presenting esti-
m a t i o n s, we will discuss the special position of Italy. After that we
will present  the definitive  specification  as  well  as  the  estimation
re s u l t s.
I t a l y
The main problem with estimating the basic model is that there may
be (big) countries with specific economic circumstances not cove re d
by our model which could influence the estimates towa rds implausi-
ble re s u l t s. The country we suspect may deviate most from the other
countries is Italy. Looking at table 1, we see that Italy combines a
high level of self-employment with a normal (near ave rage) level of
per capita income. This is unusual: the countries with many self-
e m p l oyed (business ow n e rs) are generally in a less advanced stage
of economic development (for example Greece and Spain). Ro u g h l y,
Italy can be divided in two quite different types of economies: a we l l -
d eveloped economy (Northern Italy) and a less developed economy
(Southern Italy or the Mezzogiorno). Italy might not fit well in our
model because it basically consists of two different economies. A
closer inspection of the data for Northern and Southern Italy1 s h ows
that Northern Italy in particular deviates from the expected pattern,
i . e., the U-shaped or L-shaped trend of the re l a t i ve number of busi-
ness ow n e rs set out against per capita income. Here, a high self-
e m p l oyment rate is combined with a re l a t i vely high value of the GDP
per  capita.  Small  and  medium-sized  firms  play  a  bigger  role  in
(Northern) Italian manufacturing than in other industrialized coun-
t r i e s. A notable feature of the organization of Italian small and medi-
um-sized firm production is its high geographical concentration in
small areas or industrial districts (Piore and Sabel 1984). The geo-
g raphical  distribution  also  shows  that  the  majority  of  small  and
medium-sized  manufacturing  firms  is  located  in  Northern  and
C e n t ral Italy (Acs en Au d retsch, 1993). It often has a strong family
c o m p o n e n t .
The specific Italian model of ex t e n s i ve small and medium-sized firm
p roduction when compared to other countries in similar stages of
d evelopment may have positive and/or negative effects on econom-
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1 S e p a rate data for North- and South-Italy are obtained from the Eurostat Regio ns Statistic a l
Ye a r b o o k .ic growth. Many of the Italian firms are highly specialized and are
o rganized on a flexible basis, so as to meet specific customer needs,
and produce well designed and fashionable goods, aimed at the rich-
est  segments  of  the  market.  Another characteristic  of  the  Italian
model, howeve r, is that Italian R&D ex p e n d i t u res as a percentage of
GNP are by far the lowest among the largest OECD-countries. They
amount to only half of that in Germany, the U.S. and Japan over a
long period (Klomp and Pronk 1998, p. 167). Hence, the number of
business ow n e rs in Northern Italy is higher than one would ex p e c t
on the basis of the advanced stage of economic development. The
data for Southern Italy seem to be in conformity with the general pat-
tern: there is also a high level of self-employment but combined with
a low value of the GDP per capita. 
Further suspicions are illustrated in table 2 where the deve l o p m e n t
of GDP per capita and the number of business ow n e rs per labor forc e
for the period 1974 through 1994 is reported for the major industri-
alized (G7) countries U.S., Japan, Canada, Germany (Western part),
U.K., France and Italy. Notice that, along with Spain, these countries
weigh the most heavily in the estimations such that deviations in the
pattern re l a t i ve number of business ow n e rs ve rsus GDP per capita for
these countries will influence the parameter estimates considera b l y.
Table 2 Per capita  inc o me* and  self-employme nt** in G7  count r ie s,
1 9 7 4 - 1 9 9 4
Y / C A P Y / C A P self-empl.  s e l f - e m p l .
C o u nt r y 1 9 7 4 1 9 9 4 1 9 7 4 1 9 9 4
U . S . 1 6 , 9 3 8 2 3 , 1 2 3 0 . 0 9 2 0 . 1 0 3
Ja p a n 1 0 , 5 8 9 1 8 , 6 5 5 0 . 1 1 9 0 . 0 9 2
C a na da 1 3 , 4 8 1 1 8 , 4 5 3 0 . 0 7 2 0 . 1 0 9
G e r ma ny (Western part) 1 2 , 9 1 7 1 8 , 9 9 9 0 . 0 6 7 0 . 0 8 0
U . K . 1 1 , 4 5 7 1 6 , 1 7 6 0 . 0 6 7 0 . 1 1 0
F ra nc e 1 2 , 7 8 1 1 7 , 5 7 7 0 . 1 0 6 0 . 0 8 0
It a l y 1 0 , 9 5 1 1 6 , 6 1 8 0 . 1 4 4 0 . 1 8 1
* Unity: purc h a s i ng power parities per U.S. $ at 1990 pric e s.
* * Relative variable: per labor fo rc e.
As can be seen from table 2, the level of self-employment is much
higher in Italy than in the other G7 countries while the per capita
income does not deviate considera b l y. For exa m p l e, the U.K. has a
l ower value of the GDP per capita in 1994. The higher level of self-
e m p l oyment in Italy can be explained in part by specific Italian pol-
i cy stimulating the small business sector. Our conclusion is that the
Italian economy has some specific characteristics that are not embed-
ded in our basic model.
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We introduce a dummy variable DI TA that is 1 for the Italian obser-
vations and 0 elsew h e re. There are seve ral ways to use the dummy
in equation 1a. Specifically, it could be placed inside or outside the
p a rabola describing the equilibrium rate of business ow n e rship (or
both inside a n d outside the parabola). Clearly, the interpretations dif-
f e r. When the dummy is placed inside the parabola (parameter aI TA
in model (2) below), it is assumed that the Italian economy has a dif-
f e rent  equilibrium  relation  between  business  ow n e rship  and  the
stage of economic development than economies of other countries.
In other wo rd s, Italy is assumed to have a higher (the dummy para-
meter aI TA  is expected to have a positive value) level of business
ow n e rship. In that case self-employment is generally considered a
m o re natural option to be active in the labor market than in other
c o u n t r i e s. When the dummy is placed outside the parabola (para-
meter d0 , I TA in model (2) below), it is assumed that an autonomous
rise in the actual number of business owners has taken place in Italy.
This might be the case because of the specific government policies
p romoting start-ups. When such an autonomous rise in self-employ-
ment takes place, it can have positive and negative effects on eco-
nomic growth depending on whether or not the initial number of
business ow n e rs is higher or lower than the equilibrium ra t e. A final
possibility is a combination of the two former ones, i.e., an Italy-
d u m my is placed inside as well as outside the parabola. In that case
we allow for a possibly different equilibrium relation as well as an
autonomous rise in the number of business ow n e rs. The model then
looks as follows (note that the equilibrium function is now put dire c t-
ly into the business ow n e rship equation and the growth equation):
(2a)
(2b)
S t ra i g h t f o r wa rd Likelihood Ratio tests (LR tests) can be applied to
validate the specific role of Italy.1 The assumption of a structura l l y
d i f f e rent economy corresponds with the restriction d0 , I TA = 0, where-
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1 We also tested for possible impacts on econo m ic growth of the de v ia t i ng form of the ent re-
p re neurship equa t ion for Italy by also impleme nt i ng an It a l y - du m my in the growth equa t io n .
Ho w e v e r, the null hy p o t hesis of the corre s p o nd i ng para meter being equal to zero could no t
be rejected for any of the varia nts of the ent re p re neurship equa t io n .as the assumption of an autonomous rise in self-employment corre-
sponds with the restriction aI TA = 0. First we test model (2) against
the alternative model that follows when we impose the re s t r i c t i o n
d0 , I TA = 0. The restriction is rejected: the value of the test statistic is
7.4 whereas the critical value at the 5% significance level is 3.84 (c2
distribution with 1 degree of freedom). The second choice is betwe e n
model (2) and the model that remains when imposing aI TA = 0. This
restriction is not rejected at the 5% level: the test statistic is 3.0
w h e reas the critical value is again 3.84. We conclude that Italy does
not have a different equilibrium relation between self-employ m e n t
and the stage of economic development, but that Italy has deve l o p e d
an autonomous (additional) rise in the number of business ow n e rs
when compared to other countries.
5 . 1 Re s u l t s
P roceeding with equation (2) with aI TA = 0 we obtain
( 3 a )
( 3 b )
The  model is estimated  using  FIML. The sample consists of 184
o b s e r vations: 23 countries times 8 ye a rs (1980 through 1994, only
the even ye a rs ) .1 Weighing with the number of business ow n e rs (in
the year t-4) implies that all variables (including constants and dum-
mies) are multiplied with the square root of the number of business
ow n e rs before the FIML pro c e d u re is run. In this way, bigger coun-
tries are given a bigger influence in determining the parameter esti-
mates  than  smaller  countries.  The  weighing  pro c e d u re  will  be
explained in detail in appendix II.
The estimation results of model (3) are in table 3.2 N ext to the para-
meter  estimates  we  report  some  characteristics  of  the  para b o l a
describing the equilibrium rate of business ow n e rs by reporting some
statistics for different values of the GDP per capita.3
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1 No t ice that for the Y variable (gross do me s t ic pro duct), which has a lag of eig ht years in the
s e c o nd equa t ion 3b, we also dispose of data for the year 1972.
2 We also estimated the mo del without the It a l y - du m my in (3a). This changes the results con-
s ide ra b l y, especially the para meters of the parabola a, b a nd g, the erro r - c o r re c t ion para me-
ter b0 ( w h ich becomes 0.04) and the ‘punishme nt’ para meter c0, which becomes ins ig n i f i-
c a nt. The loglike l i hood value is -378.6 such that the null hy p o t hesis of d0 , I TA b e i ng equal to
z e ro is rejected convinc i ngly (loglike l i hood of (3) is -364.7,  see table 3) in an LR-test
between the mo dels with and without the It a l y - du m my in the ent re p re neurship equa t io n .
3 For these calculatio ns, the exact para meter estimates (6 de c i mals) have been used.Table 3 E s t i ma t ion results mo del (3)*
Pa ra m e t e r E s t i m a t e Pa ra m e t e r E s t i m a t e
d0 , I TA . 0 1 1 b2 - . 0 3 5
( 6 . 2 ) ( - 3 . 0 )
b0 . 1 3 d1 . 1 8
( 6 . 3 ) ( 1 1 . 1 )
a . 4 6 c0 - 3 . 6 7
( 8 . 9 ) ( - 2 . 5 1 )
b - . 0 3 9 c1 - . 2 0
( - 6 . 2 ) ( - 3 . 6 )
g . 0 0 1 0 c2 - . 0 0 3 1
( 5 . 4 ) ( - 3 . 8 )
b1 . 0 7 8
( 7 . 0 )
S t a t i s t i c s
m i n i mum of para b o l a . 0 8 8 R2 ( 3 a ) . 4 1
Y/CAP (min.) 1 9 0 4 1 R2 ( 3 b ) . 7 0
equilibrium self-empl. at . 1 7 # observatio ns 1 8 4
Y / C A P = 1 0 ( 0 0 0 ) 1 0 0 0 0 l o g - l i ke l i ho o d - 3 6 4 . 7
* t-values are between pare nt he s e s.
As can be seen from table 3, all parameter estimates are significant.
N o t a b l y, the hypothesized equilibrium rate of business ow n e rs h i p
indeed appears to exist. Pa ra m e t e rs a, b, and g a re significantly dif-
fering from zero. Also, b , and g h ave the predicted signs and a l i e s
b e t ween  zero  and  one,  as  expected.  Further  investigation  of  the
p a rabola shows that the minimum value is reached for a level of per
capita income of 19041 purchasing power parities per U.S. $ at 1990
prices (abbreviated as PPPs from now on). The minimum level of
equilibrium business ow n e rship is 8.8% of the labor forc e. Notice
that in the equilibrium relation per capita income is ex p ressed in
t h o u s a n d s of PPPs. For lower values of GDP per capita (which corre-
sponds to less we l l - d eveloped economies), the equilibrium rate of
business ow n e rship is considerably higher: 17% at 10000 PPPs and
28% at 5477 PPPs (the lowest value of GDP per capita in our sample
is Greece in 1974). For the highest value of GDP per capita in our
sample  (23731  PPPs  in  Luxe m b o u rg  1994),  equilibrium  business
ow n e rship is 11%. 
For the interpretation of this parabola describing the equilibrium ra t e
of business ow n e rship given a certain stage of economic deve l o p-
ment, it should be noted that the relation is based upon a limited
range of values of GDP per capita. For values of per capita income far
outside our sample ra n g e, for example 50000 PPPs, the equilibrium
rate of business ow n e rship is not properly described by the quadra t-
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term predictions of the rate of business ow n e rship, since the ra t e
would go beyond 1 eve n t u a l l y. Howeve r, since the U.S. data play an
important role in estimating the parabola and since the U.S. have
high values of GDP per capita throughout the ye a rs re l a t i ve to most
other  countries,  predictions  of  the  (equilibrium)  rate  of  business
ow n e rship can be made for most countries up to about 20 ye a rs
ahead using the estimated para m e t e rs. This can be done because
most countries have not yet reached the stage of economic deve l o p-
ment of the U.S. For the U.S., predictions can not be made that far
ahead, because the U.S. are at the edge of the range of per capita
income values in the sample.
Fu r t h e r m o re,  we  see  that  also  the  hypothesized  erro r - c o r re c t i o n
p rocess of the number of business ow n e rs towa rds the equilibrium
rate is supported: parameter b0 is significantly positive. The speed of
adjustment is not high: the deviation from equilibrium at a certain
point in time decreases with 13 percent point in a period of four
ye a rs. This corresponds to a 50 percent point decrease in a period of
t wenty ye a rs and a 75 percent point decrease in a period of 40 ye a rs,
ceteris paribus. The low value of the speed of adjustment is not sur-
prising: the process of the re l a t i ve number of business ow n e rs con-
ve rging to the equilibrium number is intrinsically slow because it
i n vo l ves both changes in policies and structural changes of the sup-
ply side (setting up enterprises, investments in physical and human
capital, dive s t m e n t s, etc. ) .
The parameter b1 points to a positive impact of unemployment on
s e l f - e m p l oyment: every percent point rise in the unemployment ra t e
leads to a rise of 0.078 percent point in the self-employment rate in
the succeeding six ye a rs. This is in accordance with earlier studies:
u n e m p l oyment  is  a  push  factor  for  self-employment  (Evans  and
Leighton 1989 and Storey 1991). The other variable explaining the
change in self-employment, the labor income quote, also shows a
significant parameter with the expected sign: the parameter b2 is neg-
a t i ve. This means that higher business profitability indeed acts as a
pull factor for business ow n e rship. The remaining variable in the
business ow n e rship equation, the Italy-dummy, shows a significant
p o s i t i ve parameter (d0 , I TA): in Italy the rate of business ow n e rs h i p
rises faster than in other countries.
Another important characteristic of the estimation results is the dev i-
ation of the actual number of business ow n e rs from the equilibrium
rate having a negative impact on economic growth: the parameter c0
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f ew business ow n e rs can grow by stimulating business ow n e rship. In
section 5.3 the magnitude of the impact will be analyzed for differ-
ent values of the dev i a t i o n .
In the growth equation,  lagged growth  has a negative  para m e t e r
value (c1 = -0.20) re p resenting cyclical fluctuations: a period of high
economic growth is followed by a period with lower growth and vice
ve rsa. The per capita income parameter is significantly negative. This
might reflect the conve rgence of countries hy p o t h e s i s. Howeve r, a
w i t h i n - b e t ween analysis reveals that this parameter value is mainly
a within effect: the negative impact on growth of a higher GDP per
capita exists w i t h i n the countries over the ye a rs but not between the
c o u n t r i e s.1 T h e re f o re, the negative parameter c2 can best be inter-
p reted as a re g ression-to-the-mean effect: a higher value of GDP per
capita in a certain year leads to a smaller economic growth in the
subsequent period. Finally, the constant term d1 is positive.
C o n ve rgence to equilibrium rate of business ow n e rs h i p
An interesting question is how the actual number of business ow n-
e rs (re l a t i ve to the labor force) has developed over time in compari-
son to the equilibrium rate of business ow n e rs as implied by the
model outcomes. From table 3 we see that the equilibrium rate of
business ow n e rship can be ex p ressed as E*i t = .46 -.039 Y/CAPi t +
. 0 010 (Y/CAP)i t
2. Note that Y/CAP is ex p ressed in thousands of PPPs
(U.S. 1990 dollars) in this formula. In table 4 we report the differe n c e
b e t ween the actual number of business ow n e rs and the equilibrium
rate of business ow n e rship, E-E*, for all 23 OECD-countries in our
dataset for the ye a rs 1974, 1984 and 1994 (first, middle and last ye a r
of our sample).2
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1 F u r t her results of this within-between analysis are the fo l l o w i ng: the positive impact of
u ne m p l o y me nt on self-employme nt growth is a within effect (by and large, this reflects the
fact that mainly the new unemployed persons become self-employed) and the ne g a t i v e
impact of the labor inc o me quote on business ownership is a between effect. The para me t e r s
de s c r i b i ng the equilibrium rate of business ownership a, b a nd g can be characterized as a
m i x t u re of a within effect and a between effect.
2 For these calculatio ns, the exact para meter estimates of the equilibrium rate have been used:
a = .458385, b = -.038862 and g = .00102049.Table 4 E-E*, 1974-1994*
C o u nt r y 1 9 7 4 1 9 8 4 1 9 9 4
Au s t r ia - 7 . 8 - 5 . 8 - 3 . 2
B e l g i u m - 3 . 7 - 1 . 1 2 . 2
D e n ma r k - 4 . 5 - 3 . 3 - 2 . 5
F i n l a nd - 1 1 . 5 - 6 . 3 - 3 . 5
F ra nc e - 2 . 2 - 0 . 9 - 1 . 1
G e r ma ny (We s t ) - 6 . 0 - 3 . 2 - 0 . 8
G re e c e - 1 0 . 2 - 6 . 6 - 2 . 4
I re l a nd - 1 5 . 2 - 1 0 . 0 - 0 . 3
It a l y - 1 . 1 4 . 6 8 . 7
L u xe m b o u rg 0 . 3 - 0 . 8 - 5 . 5
Ne t he r l a nd s - 3 . 7 - 3 . 4 0 . 3
Po r t u g a l - 1 7 . 4 - 1 1 . 6 0 . 0
S p a i n - 4 . 2 - 3 . 4 3 . 0
S w e de n - 5 . 4 - 3 . 7 - 1 . 7
U . K . - 8 . 0 - 3 . 6 1 . 3
Ic e l a nd - 7 . 4 - 3 . 6 2 . 5
No r w a y - 5 . 5 - 0 . 8 - 0 . 7
S w i t z e r l a nd 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 8
U . S . - 0 . 1 1 . 3 - 0 . 3
Ja p a n - 4 . 3 0 . 1 0 . 4
C a na da - 4 . 8 - 0 . 9 2 . 0
Au s t ra l ia - 1 . 6 2 . 8 5 . 6
New Ze a l a nd - 1 . 3 1 . 0 5 . 8
* Unity: perc e nt point s.
In 1974, almost all countries have too few self-employed re l a t i ve to
the equilibrium va l u e. For most countries, the actual equilibrium ra t e
c o n ve rges to the equilibrium in the subsequent twenty ye a rs. Striking
examples of this phenomenon are Ireland and Portugal. These coun-
tries show a deviation of more than 15 percent point in 1974 and a
d eviation of zero in 1994. Other countries with clear conve rgence are
Finland,  Germany,  Gre e c e,  the  Netherlands,  Sweden,  the  U.K.,
N o r way and Japan. Conve rgence takes place in twenty ye a rs: for a
number of countries the deviation of 1974 disappeared almost com-
pletely in 1994. In our discussion of the estimation results of model
3 it is brought forwa rd that the erro r - c o r rection parameter b0, which
has value 0.13, leads to a reduction of 50% of the initial deviation in
a period of twenty ye a rs. Hence, actual conve rgence to equilibrium
t a kes place faster than  implied by the  erro r - c o r rection para m e t e r.
H oweve r, the calculation based on the parameter b0 was made under
the ceteris paribus condition of all other variables than E re m a i n i n g
constant. Obviously this is not the case in re a l i t y. From equation 3a
we see that changes in unemployment and the labor income quote
h ave an impact on the growth rate of business ow n e rship, which in
turn can accelerate the conve rgence pro c e s s. Howeve r, the ex p l a n a-
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change of the actual self-employment ra t e, but also in a change of the
equilibrium rate over time. Because equilibrium self-employment is
a function of per capita income, which in general rises considera b l y
in twenty ye a rs (see table 2 for the G7 countries), the equilibrium
rate goes down because for most countries the rise of per capita
income in the period 1974 through 1994 takes place in the dow nwa rd
part  of  the  parabola.  In  general,  the  reduction  of  the  dev i a t i o n
b e t ween actual and equilibrium self-employment is due to a decre a s-
ing equilibrium rate of self-employment and, to a smaller extent, to
an increasing rate of (actual) self-employment. 
From table 4 it can be seen that the U.S. deviation is always small:
b e l ow 1.5 percent point. Only for Switzerland the deviation is also
this small during the whole period. This is a reflection of the we i g h t
the  U.S.  re p resents  in  determining  the  equilibrium  re l a t i o n .
T h e re f o re, the low deviations for the U.S. should be interpreted with
caution. Fu r t h e r m o re, we see a considerable increase in the value of
(E-E*) for Ireland, Portugal and Spain in the period 1984 thro u g h
1994. This may have to do with the integration of these countries in
the European Union and the use of funds channelled to these coun-
tries promoting small and young firms. Another phenomenon that
a t t racts attention is that in 1994, certain countries have too many
s e l f - e m p l oyed re l a t i ve to the stage of economic development. The
countries with the highest p o s i t i v e d eviation from the equilibrium are
N ew Zealand, Au s t ralia and Italy. In New Zealand this may be a
result of the economic reforms in this country, through which busi-
ness ow n e rship experienced a big boost in the early eighties. See
E vans et al. (1996). The positive deviation is highest for Italy: 8.7
p e rcent point. This indicates that the high level of self-employ m e n t
in Italy is not efficient: it has a re l a t i vely large negative impact on
economic grow t h .1
5 . 2 A l t e r n a t i ve model specifications
In this section we investigate two alternative model specifications.
The first has to do with using the dev i a t i o n - variable in the grow t h
equation. The second one deals with an alternative formulation of
the equilibrium rate of business ow n e rs h i p .
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1 In It a l y, re s e a rch and de v e l o p me nt ex p e nd i t u res are by far the lowest amo ng the largest OECD
c o u nt r ies as a perc e nt a ge of gross na t io nal pro duct. This is in line with the idea that whe n
t he re are too ma ny business owne r s, the scale advant a ges in re s e a rch and de v e l o p me nt are
not utilized. See Cohen and Klepper (1996).Absolute deviation impact in growth equation
So far, we have paid little attention to how the deviation of the actu-
al rate of self-employment from the equilibrium rate is specified in
the growth equation. We have chosen the square of the deviation as
a convenient variable because the sign of the deviation (positive or
n e g a t i ve) is of no concern. Howeve r, we then implicitly assume that
the (negative) impact on growth increases more than pro p o r t i o n a l l y
with  the  magnitude  of  the  deviation.  This  seems  a  re a s o n a b l e
assumption. Howeve r, one can also imagine that the impact incre a s-
es proportionally with the magnitude of the deviation. To inve s t i g a t e
whether or not this specification is more appropriate than the qua-
d ratic deviation impact, we estimate the following model where the
absolute value of the deviation is taken as explanatory variable in the
g rowth equation.1
( 4 a )
( 4 b )
.
The estimation results are in table 5.
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1 Next to the differe nce between a linear and a qua dra t ic impact on growth we have also trie d
to test for ano t her implicit assumption of the (qua dra t ic) form of the de v ia t io n - v a r ia b l e, viz.,
t he symmetry in the impact of positive and negative de v ia t io ns. We used a two-step me t ho d
in which both mo del equa t io ns are estimated separately: first the business ownership equa-
t ion and after that the growth equa t ion. Based on the outcomes of the business owne r s h i p
e q ua t ion (i.e. the equilibrium rate para meters a, b a nd g), we cons t r ucted differe nt de v ia-
t io n - v a r iables for the growth equa t ion for positive and negative de v ia t io ns. Ho w e v e r, we
could not distinguish between impacts of both types of de v ia t io ns because we had too few
o b s e r v a t io ns with a positive de v ia t ion. The two-step me t hod is described in detail in appen-
dix III.Table 5 E s t i ma t ion results of mo del (4)*
Pa ra m e t e r E s t i m a t e Pa ra m e t e r E s t i m a t e
d0 , I TA . 0 1 1 b2 - . 0 3 6
( 6 . 6 ) ( - 3 . 1 )
b0 . 1 3 d1 . 2 1
( 6 . 8 ) ( 1 0 . 2 )
a . 4 7 c0 - . 6 5
( 1 0 . 3 ) ( - 3 . 9 )
b - . 0 4 1 c1 - . 2 3
( - 7 . 3 ) ( - 4 . 1 )
g . 0 0 1 1 c2 - . 0 0 4 5
( 6 . 3 ) ( - 4 . 3 )
b1 . 0 7 7
( 6 . 8 )
S t a t i s t i c s
m i n i mum of para b o l a . 0 8 9 R2 ( 4 a ) . 4 1
Y/CAP (min.) 1 8 8 6 6 R2 ( 4 b ) . 7 1
equilibrium self-empl. at . 1 7 # observatio ns 1 8 4
Y / C A P = 1 0 ( 0 0 0 ) 1 0 0 0 0 l o g - l i ke l i ho o d - 3 6 0 . 5
* t-values are between pare nt he s e s.
We see that, except for c0, the parameter estimates hardly differ fro m
those of model (3) in table 3. The parameter of the deviation va r i a b l e
c0 is different. This is not surprising, since the measurement units are
d i f f e rent. Analyzing whether the different specifications imply differ-
ent impacts of deviations from the equilibrium rate we see that in the
original model with the quadratic impact c0 = -3.67. In the alterna-
t i ve model with the linear impact c0 = -.65. We can calculate the
impact on economic growth of a deviation of one percent point fro m
equilibrium. For model (3) the negative impact is 3.67 * 0.012 =
. 0 0 0367 (.0367 percent point), whereas for model (4) the impact is
.65 * .01 = .0065 (.65 percent point). Hence, for a 1% deviation the
impact on cumulative growth in the subsequent four ye a rs is almost
18 times greater for the linear impact specification than for the qua-
d ratic impact specification Of cours e, this difference becomes small-
er when the deviation incre a s e s. See table 6.
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ic (mo del (3)) de v ia t ion specific a t io ns *
D e v ia t io n Mo del (3): c0 = -3.67 Mo del (4): c0 = -.65 Factor (4)/(3)
1 . 0 3 7 . 6 5 1 8
2 . 1 5 1 . 3 9
5 . 9 2 3 . 3 3 . 6
1 0 3 . 7 6 . 5 1 . 8
1 8 1 2 1 2 1
2 0 1 5 1 3 . 9
* Unity: perc e nt points (except last column).
From table 6, we see that the impact of a deviation of the actual num-
ber of business ow n e rs from the equilibrium rate is generally gre a t e r
for model (4) with the linear type of impact than for model (3) with
the quadratic type of impact. Only when the deviation is in excess of
18  percent  points,  the  impact  of  model  (3)  becomes  gre a t e r.
H oweve r, an (absolute) deviation of 18 percent point is outside the
range of values that we find for the deviation from equilibrium, see
table 4. In general we can say that the negative impact on growth of
a deviation is quite large for the linear impact model (.65 perc e n t
point  for  every  percent  point  deviation)  while  for  the  quadra t i c
impact model the negative impact is small for small deviations and
becomes greater for larger deviations (1% impact on growth when
the deviation becomes greater than 5%). Fu r t h e r m o re, we see fro m
table 5 that the loglikelihood value is higher for model (4) than for
model (3): -360.5 ve rsus -364.7. Although the models are not nested,
so that a formal LR-test cannot be applied (at least not in a stra i g h t-
f o r wa rd way), this is an indication that the linear impact model (4)
is a more appropriate specification than the quadratic impact model
(3). The differe n c e s, howeve r, are small. 
Declining equilibrium function (quadratic deviation impact)
Because in the basic ve rsion of our model we hypothesized the re l a-
tion between the number of business ow n e rs and the stage of eco-
nomic development to be U-shaped, we chose a quadratic form for
the  equilibrium  function  in  that  model.  We  have  seen  that  the
implied minimum of the estimated parabola is reached for a per capi-
ta  income level  of  19041  U.S.  1990 dollars.  From  our per  capita
income data we know that only 10 of the 184 observations in the esti-
mation sample have a value of per capita income higher than 19041 .
Although four of these are of the U.S. having the highest we i g h i n g
factor in the FIML estimations one may suspect that the rising part
of the parabola is not properly described by the estimated para m e-
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ing to fit an ever declining equilibrium function and that this is the
reason that almost all observations belong in the declining part of the
estimated parabola.  There f o re  we  investigate  whether  a  differe n t
functional form for the equilibrium function leads to a better fit. We
choose the following functional form: E*i t = a0 + a1/ ( Y / C A Pi t+ 1 ) .
Notice  that  this  is  a  strict  monotonic  decreasing  function  with
a symptote a0. The model then reads as follows :
( 5 a )
( 5 b )
( 5 c )
Again we estimate the model with the number of business ow n e rs as
weighing va r i a b l e. The results are in table 7.
Table 7 E s t i ma t ion results mo del (5)
Pa ra m e t e r E s t i m a t e Pa ra m e t e r E s t i m a t e
d0 , I TA . 0 0 9 8 b2 - . 0 3 9
( 5 . 4 ) ( - 3 . 4 )
b0 . 1 2 d1 . 1 7
( 5 . 9 ) ( 1 1 . 3 )
a0 - . 0 1 3 c0 - 3 . 1 8
( - . 7 3 ) ( - 2 . 2 6 )
a1 2 . 0 2 c1 - . 2 0
( 6 . 6 ) ( - 3 . 6 )
b1 . 0 7 8 c2 - . 0 0 3 0
( 7 . 1 ) ( - 3 . 8 )
S t a t i s t i c s
asymptote of eq. func t io n - . 0 1 3 R2 ( 5 a ) . 4 0
as Y/CAP ® ¥ R2 ( 5 b ) . 7 0
equilibrium self-empl. at . 1 7 # observatio ns 1 8 4
Y / C A P = 1 0 0 0 0 l o g - l i ke l i ho o d - 3 6 7 . 2
* t-values are between pare nt he s e s.
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model with quadratic equilibrium function), we see that the para-
meter estimates hardly differ (except for the equilibrium function
p a ra m e t e rs). The parameter a1 describing the declining character of
the equilibrium function is significantly positive. Using the para m e-
ter estimates of a0 and a1 we can write the equilibrium function of
model (5) as E*i t = -.013+ 2.02 / ( Y / C A Pi t+1). The asymptote of this
function is not significantly different from zero: the t-value is -.73.
Note that for Y/CAP = 0, the implied re l a t i ve number of business
ow n e rs by model (5) is less realistic than for the quadratic equilibri-
um function: 2.0 ve rsus .46. Looking at the range of values of GDP
per capita in our sample we find an equilibrium rate of business
ow n e rship that varies between 30% of the labor force (Greece 1974)
and 6.8% (Luxe m b o u rg 1994). Remember that the corre s p o n d i n g
range for the quadratic equilibrium model (3), was between 28%
and 11%. We observe that for high values of GDP per capita, the
implied equilibrium rates start to differ between both models. This is
e a sy to understand. At first both equilibrium functions are declining
with an increasing value of per capita income. When the minimum
of the parabola is reached, howeve r, the quadratic function starts to
rise while the monotonic decreasing function of model (5) continues
to decline. Because many countries in our sample are still in the
phase of the decreasing part of the parabola during (the largest part
of) the estimation period (i.e. the equilibrium number of self-employ-
ment is still decreasing because of the occurrence of economies of
scale), the FIML pro c e d u re can not distinguish between the quadra t-
ic function and the monotonic decreasing function: both models dis-
p l ay a good fit with high t-va l u e s. Again, a nested LR-test is not pos-
sible but the loglike l i h o o d - values show that there is not much differ-
ence between both model fits: -364.7 for model (3) ve rsus -367.2 for
model (5). Notice that model (5) has one parameter less than model
(3). This indicates that we cannot distinguish between both models
s t a t i s t i c a l l y.
Another argument that the quadratic equilibrium function is more
a p p ropriate than the declining equilibrium function is illustrated by
the figures 1a and 1b. In these figures business ow n e rship is set out
against per capita income for the major industrialized countries (G7)
for the sample period 1974 through 1994. In figure 1b, we have also
plotted the estimated equilibrium functions. The dotted line in figure
1b  re p resents  the  estimated  function  E*i t =  -.013+  2.02 / ( Y /
C A Pi t+1) and the dotted line with the marke rs re p resents the esti-
mated function E*i t = .46 -.039 Y/CAPi t + .0010 (Y/CAP)i t
2. The
other lines in figure 1b are the same as in figure 1a. For ease of 
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Extended model and estimation resultsp resentation, we have not inserted the names of the countries in fig-
u re 1b. Notice that business ow n e rship is again a re l a t i ve va r i a b l e
(per labor force) and that the x-axis starts at 10000 PPPs. We see that,
of the G7 countries, only Japan and France show a descending pat-
tern of the re l a t i ve number of business ow n e rs as the GDP per capi-
ta rises. In the other countries the number of business ow n e rs rises
or stays constant when countries reach a higher stage of economic
d evelopment. There f o re, it is unrealistic to assume that the equilibri-
um number of business ow n e rs would always decline. This can also
be seen in figure 1b. When the level of per capita income grows, the
declining function deviates increasingly from the values of per capi-
ta income/self-employment for the G7-countries, while the quadra t-
ic function is more or less in line with the values in the sample. The
U.S. are the best example of this phenomenon, since it is the only
G7-country with values of per capita income at levels where the equi-
librium values of the two functions are quite different from each
other (viz., the high values of Y/CAP). For these high values of GDP
per capita, the quadratic equilibrium function is the better approx i-
mation, as can be seen from figure 1b. Thus, also on the basis of a
g raphical analysis of the equilibrium functions, we tend to conclude
that the quadratic function is a more realistic specification than the
declining function. 
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F ig u re 1a B u s i ness ownership versus per capita inc o me for G7-count r ie s, 1974-1994
E
Y / C A PDeclining equilibrium function (absolute deviation impact)
We observed that for the quadratic equilibrium function, the model
with the impact of the deviation of the actual number of business
ow n e rs from the equilibrium rate on growth specified as an absolute
d eviation (model (4)) had a slightly better model fit than the qua-
d ratic deviation impact model (3). It is interesting to see whether this
is  also  the  case  for  the  declining  equilibrium  function  model.
T h e re f o re we present the following model (the equilibrium function
is put directly into the business ow n e rship equation and the grow t h
e q u a t i o n ) :
( 6 a )
( 6 b )
Again we estimate the model with the number of business ow n e rs as
weighing va r i a b l e. The results are in table 8.
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E
F ig u re 1b B u s i ness ownership versus per capita inc o me for G7-count r ie s, 1974-1994, with eq.
f u nc t io ns
Y / C A P
ETable 8 E s t i ma t ion results mo del (6)*
Pa ra m e t e r E s t i m a t e Pa ra m e t e r E s t i m a t e
d0 , I TA . 0 1 0 0 b1 - . 0 3 8
( 6 . 0 ) ( - 3 . 4 )
b0 . 1 2 d1 . 2 0
( 6 . 4 ) ( 1 1 . 0 )
a0 - . 0 0 8 4 c0 - . 6 2
( - . 6 1 ) ( - 4 . 3 )
a1 1 . 9 4 c1 - . 2 3
( 8 . 4 ) ( - 3 . 9 )
b1 . 0 7 9 c2 - . 0 0 3 6
( 7 . 0 ) ( - 3 . 8 )
S t a t i s t i c s
asymptote of eq. func t io n - . 0 0 8 4 R2 ( 6 a ) . 4 0
as Y/CAP ® ¥ R2 ( 6 b ) . 7 1
equilibrium self-empl. at . 1 7 # observatio ns 1 8 4
Y / C A P = 1 0 0 0 0 l o g - l i ke l i ho o d - 3 6 3 . 0
* t-values are between pare nt he s e s.
Comparing the results in table 8 with those in table 7 (declining equi-
librium model with quadratic deviation impact), we draw the same
conclusions as with the comparison between the models (3) and (4)
being the models with the quadratic equilibrium function. For the
range of plausible deviation values the negative impact on growth of
the linear impact model is greater than that of the quadratic impact
model. Fu r t h e r m o re, the linear impact model (6) has a higher log-
l i kelihood value than the quadratic impact model (5): -363.0 ve rs u s
-367.2. As  mentioned above,  this is an indication  that  the  linear
impact model is slightly better specified than the quadratic impact
m o d e l .
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Extended model and estimation results6 C o n c l u s i o n s
T h e re are many links between entre p re n e u rship and the macro e c o n-
o my. See Ac s, Carlsson and Karlsson (1999) for a recent and Bro c k
and Evans (1986) for an early survey. The present paper zooms in on
one specific linkage: that between the number of business ow n e rs
and economic growth. Three aspects of this linkage are inve s t i g a t e d .
F i rs t, whether there is a long-term equilibrium relation between the
number of business ow n e rs and the stage of economic deve l o p m e n t .
This  suspicion  arises  from  scrutinizing  empirical  and  theore t i c a l
work in this area. The relation is hypothesized to be a decre a s i n g
function of economic development in that the self-employment ra t e
is high in low - d eveloped economies whereas there is a later phase
w h e re mass production and scale economies thrive. A vast litera t u re
points at a still later phase of economic development where the busi-
ness ow n e rship rate is increasing again. This phase is chara c t e r i z e d
by ‘the reve rsal of the trend’ towa rds increasing economies of scale
and scope. Howeve r, it is still unclear to which extent this reve rs a l
will be structural. There f o re both a U-shaped as well as an L-shaped
equilibrium relation are tested in the present paper. S e c o n d, whether
t h e re exists a correction mechanism when the rate of business ow n-
e rship is out of equilibrium and what the speed of conve rgence is.
Out of equilibrium situations can occur due to exogenous shocks and
institutional dive rg e n c e s, for instance, because ‘government re g u l a-
tion of market activity is likely to obstruct and frustrate the sponta-
n e o u s,  corre c t i ve  forces  of  entre p reneurial  adjustments’  (Kirzner
1997, p. 81). T h i rd, whether deviating from the equilibrium rate of
business  ow n e rship  leads  to  lower  economic  growth.  The  thre e
aspects are tested using a two-equation model. The first equation
explains the growth of the number of business ow n e rs using the
d eviation of the equilibrium rate of business ow n e rship, unemploy-
ment as a push factor and labor income quote as a measure of busi-
ness pro f i t a b i l i t y. The second equation explains economic grow t h
using the deviation of the equilibrium rate of business ow n e rs h i p ,
lagged economic growth and the per capita income level. The model
is tested using a data panel of 23 OECD countries. Attention is paid
to the specific role of Italy’s dual economy, the penalty structure of
an economy in ‘disequilibrium’ and the shape of the long-term equi-
librium relation between the number of business ow n e rs and the
stage of economic development. 
Our investigations show that both the U-shaped and the L-shaped
relation between the number of business ow n e rs and the stage of
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discrimination cannot be made since ‘the reve rsal of the trend’ is of
a recent date only and that the minimum of the U-shaped equilibri-
um relation is within the range observations of economic deve l o p-
ment. This minimum is calculated to be approximately a business
ow n e rship rate of 8.8 % of the labor force at a per capita income of
19.000 PPPs (per US $ at 1990 prices). The assumption of a U-shaped
c u r ve would imply that modern economies are now in a phase where
the rate of business ow n e rship is likely to increase structura l l y. The
rate of business ow n e rship is shown to influence economic grow t h
t h rough deviations from the equilibrium ra t e. This result supports the
v i ew that size distribution differences across countries matter when
explaining economic performance (Davis and Henrekson 1999). As a
c o n s e q u e n c e, economies can have both too few or too many busi-
ness ow n e rs and that both situations lead to lower growth ra t e s. By
and larg e, a five percent point deviation generates a growth loss of
b e t ween one and three percent (depending upon the particular spec-
ification of the penalty function) over a period of four ye a rs. In par-
t i c u l a r, the fact that economic development may be hampered by a
number of business ow n e rs being too high considering an economy ’s
stage of development may come as a surprise for European politi-
cians who see self-employment as a forceful weapon when fighting
u n e m p l oyment  and  stagnating  growth.  Different  economic  stages
call for different development and stimulation pro g ra m s. An erro r
c o r recting mechanism exists between the real rate of business ow n-
e rship and the equilibrium ra t e. Lagged unemployment appears to be
a  significant  push  factor  of  business  ow n e rship  whereas  a  high
lagged labor income quote appears to decrease business ow n e rs h i p
rates indicating the effect of low business pro f i t a b i l i t y. Italy plays an
exceptional role in that there appears to be an additional autonomous
i n c rease of the rate  of self-employment which may frustrate eco-
nomic growth. Most countries show a conve rgence towa rds the equi-
librium rate of business ow n e rship in the period 1974 through 1994.
Our model allows for two mechanisms for a disequilibrium betwe e n
the actual and the equilibrium rate of business ow n e rship to dimin-
ish. The first explicit mechanism is that of the actual rate of business
ow n e rship to conve rge to the equilibrium one given the level of eco-
nomic development. The second implicit one is that of economic
d evelopment causing the equilibrium level to shift towa rds its actual
ra t e. Evidence is established for both mechanisms but the second
a p p e a rs to dominate the first. The speed of the first explicit error cor-
rection mechanism amounts to a half time of two decades irre s p e c-
t i ve of the choice of the equilibrium relation and the penalty func-
tion. 
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C o n c l u s i o n sAn important policy implication of our exe rcises is that not only that
‘ To induce dynamic entre p reneurial competition we re q u i re the ful-
fillment  of  only  one  condition:  guaranteeing  free  entre p re n e u r i a l
entry into any market where profit opportunities may be perc e i ved to
exist’ (Kirzner 1997, p.74) but also that exit free of stigma and finan-
cial burdens  is  safeguarded. See also Ac s, Carlsson  and Ka r l s s o n
(1999). Free entry and exit of entre p re n e u rs is a necessary condition
for the equilibrium seeking mechanisms which are vital in our model
of the relation between business ow n e rship and economic grow t h .
Fu t u re re s e a rch should investigate whether different countries have
d i f f e rent equilibrium relations depending upon institutional, indus-
trial and other dimensions and how and to what extent policy mea-
s u res are able to influence this equilibrium. Fu r t h e r m o re, while the
p resent re s e a rch is fully based upon country-wide composites, sec-
t o ral dive rsity between countries probably plays a role when ex p l a i n-
ing differences in equilibrium situation and differences in the equi-
librium restoring mechanism. For that many data problems have to
be re s o l ve d .
4 9
C o n c l u s i o n sL i t e ra t u re
Ac s, Z.J. (1996), Small Firms and Economic Growth, In: Z.J. Ac s, B. Carlsson, and A.R.
Thurik (eds.), Small Business in the Modern Economy, De Vries Lectures in Economics,
O x f o rd, U.K.: Blackwell Publishers.
Ac s, Z.J. and D.B. Au d retsch (1987), Innovation, Market Structure, and Firm Size, Re v i e w
of Economics and Statistics 69, 567-574.
Ac s, Z.J. and D.B. Au d retsch (1993), Conclusion, in: Z.J. Acs and D.B. Au d retsch (eds. ) ,
Small Firms and Entre p re n e u rship; an East-West Pe rs p e c t i v e, C a m b r i d g e, U.K.: Cambridge
U n i ve rsity Pre s s.
Ac s, Z.J., D.B. Au d retsch and D.S. Evans (1994), The Determinants of Variation in the Self-
employment Rates across Countries and over Time, mimeo (fourth dra f t ) .
Ac s, Z.J., B. Carlsson and Ch. Karlsson (1999), The Linkages among Entre p re n e u rs h i p ,
SMEs  and  the  Macro e c o n o my,  in:  Z.J.  Ac s,  B.  Carlsson  and  Ch.  Karlsson  (eds. ) ,
E n t re p re n e u rship,  Small  and  Medium-Sized  Enterprises  and  the  Macro e c o n o m y,
C a m b r i d g e, U.K.: Cambridge Unive rsity Pre s s.
Ac s, Z.J., Carlsson, B. and A.R. Thurik (1996), Small Business in the Modern Economy,
O x f o rd, U.K.: Blackwell Publishers.
A i g i n g e r, K. and G. Tichy (1991), Small Firms and the Merger Mania, Small Business
E c o n o m i c s 3, 83-101 .
A l b a - Ra m i rez, A. (1994), Self-employment in the Midst of Unemployment: The case of
Spain and the United States, Applied Economics 26, 189-20 4 .
Amit,  R.,  L.  Glosten  and  E.  Muller  (1993),  Challenges  to  Theory  Development  in
E n t re p re n e u rship Re s e a rch, Journal of Management Studies 30, 81 5 - 8 3 4 .
Au d retsch, D.B. and A.R. Thurik (1997), S o u rces of Growth: the Entre p reneurial versus the
Managed Economy, Discussion Paper TI97-109/3, Tinbergen Institute, Erasmus Unive rs i t y
Ro t t e rd a m .
Au d retsch, D.B. and A.R. Thurik (1998), The Knowledge Society, Entre p re n e u rship and
U n e m p l o y m e n t , Re s e a rch Report 9801/E, Zoetermeer: EIM Small Business Re s e a rch and
C o n s u l t a n cy.
Au d retsch, D.B. and A.R. Thurik (1999), Capitalism and Democra cy in the 21st Century:
f rom the Managed to the Entre p reneurial Economy, Journal of Evolutionary Economics,
f o r t h c o m i n g .
Baumol, W.J. (1990), Entre p re n e u rship: Pro d u c t i ve, Unpro d u c t i ve and Destructive, J o u r n a l
of Political Economy 98, 893-921 .
B l a n c h f l owe r, D.G. and B.D. Meyer (1994), A Longitudinal Analysis of the Young Self-
e m p l oyed in Au s t ralia and the U.S., Small Business Economics 6, 1-19.
B l a n c h f l owe r, D.G. and A.J. Oswald (1998), What Makes an Entre p reneur? Journal of
Labor Economics 16, 26-60.
5 1
Business Ownership and Economic Growth: An Empirical InvestigationBlau, D. (1987), A Time Series Analysis of Self-Employment, Journal of Political Economy
95, 445-467.
B re g g e r, J.E. (1996), Measuring Self-Employment  in  the United States, Monthly Labor
Re v i e w, January/February 1996, 3-9.
B rock, W.A. and D.S. Evans (1986), The Economics of Small Businesses: Their Role and
Regulation in the U.S. Economy, New York: Holmes and Meier.
C a l vo, G.A. and S. Wellisz (1980), Te c h n o l o g y, Entre p re n e u rs, and Firm Size, Q u a r t e r l y
Journal of Economics 95, 663-677.
C a r re e,  M.A.  and  A.R.  Thurik  (1998),  Small Firms  and  Economic  Growth  in  Euro p e,
Atlantic Economic Journal, Vol. 26, no 2, 137-146.
C a r re e, M.A. and A.R. Thurik (1999), Industrial Structure and Economic Growth, In: D.B.
Au d retsch and A.R. Thurik, Innovation, Industry Evolution and Employment, C a m b r i d g e ;
Cambridge Unive rsity Pre s s, (forthcoming).
Carlsson,  B.  (1989),  The  Evolution  of  Manufacturing  Technology  and  Its  Impact  on
Industrial Structure: An International Study, Small Business Economics 1, 21 - 3 7 .
C h a n d l e r,  A.D.  Jr.  (1990),  Scale  and  Scope:  The  Dynamics  of  Industrial  Capitalism,
Cambridge: Harva rd Unive rs i t y. 
Cohen, W.M. and S. Klepper (1996), A Reprise of Size and R&D, Economic Journal 10 6 ,
9 2 5 - 9 51 .
D av i s, S.J. and M. Henrekson, (1997), Explaining National Differences in the Size and
Industry Structure of Employment, Small Business Economics 12, 59-83.
EIM (1994), The European Observatory for SMEs: Second Annual Re p o r t, Zoetermeer, NL:
E I M .
EIM (1996), The European Observatory for SMEs: Fourth Annual Re p o r t, Zoetermeer, NL:
E I M .
EIM (1997), The European Observatory for SMEs: Fifth Annual Re p o r t, Zoetermeer, NL:
E I M .
Eliasson, G.E. (1995), Economic Growth through Competitive Selection, paper pre s e n t e d
at 22n d Annual E.A.R.I.E. Conference 3-6 September 1995, mimeo.
E va n s,  D.S.  and  L.S.  Leighton  (1989),  Some  Empirical  Aspects  of  Entre p re n e u rs h i p ,
American Economic Re v i e w 79, 51 9 - 5 3 5 .
E va n s, L., A. Grimes, B. Wilkinson and D. Teece (1996), Economic Reform in New Zealand
1984-95: The Pursuit of Efficiency, Journal of Economic Litera t u re 34, 1856-1902 .
Fiegenbaum, A. and A. Karnani (1991), Output Flexibility – A Competitive Ad vantage for
Small Firms, S t rategic Management Journal 12, 101 - 11 4 .
Freeman, C. and C. Pe rez (1988), Structural Crises of Adjustment: Business Cycles and
I n vestment Behav i o r, In: G. Dosi et al., Technical Change and Economic Theory, London:
Pinter Publishers.
G a l b raith, J.K. (1956), American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Po w e r, Boston:
Houghton Mifflin.
5 2
L i t e r a t u r eG i f f o rd, S. (1992), Allocation of Entre p reneurial Attention, Journal of Economic Behavior
and Org a n i z a t i o n 19, 265-284.
G i f f o rd, S. (1993), Heterogeneous Ability, Career Choice and Firm Size, Small Business
Economics 5, 249-259.
G i f f o rd, S. (1998), Limited Entre p reneurial Attention and Economic Deve l o p m e n t , S m a l l
Business Economics 10, 17-30 .
H e n rekson, M. and D. Johansson (1999), Institutional Effects on the Evolution of the Size
Distribution of Firms, Small Business Economics 12, 11 - 2 3 .
H o l m e s, T.J. and J.A. Schmitz Jr. (1990), A Theory of Entre p re n e u rship and its Application
to the Study of Business Tra n s f e rs, Journal of Political Economy 98, 265-294.
Inman, R.P. (ed.) (1985), Managing the service economy, Cambridge: Cambridge Unive rs i t y
P re s s.
Iyigun,  M.F.  and  A.L.  Owen  (1998),  Risk,  Entre p re n e u rship,  and  Human  Capital
Accumulation, American Economic Re v i e w, Pa p e rs and Pro c e e d i n g s 88, 454-457.
Jackson,  L.F.  (1984),  Hiera rchic  Demand  and  the  Engle  Curve  for  Va r i e t y,  Review  of
Economics and Statistics 66, 8-15.
Jensen, M.C. (1993), The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Fa i l u re of Internal
C o n t rol Sys t e m s, Journal of Finance 68, 831 - 8 8 0 .
J ova n ov i c, B. (1993), The Dive rsification of Production, B rookings Pa p e rs: Micro e c o n o m i c s
1993, 197-235.
K i h l s t rom, R.E. and J.J. Laffont (1979), A General Equilibrium Entre p reneurial Theory of
Firm Formation Based on Risk ave rsion, Journal of Political Economy 87, 71 9 - 7 4 8 .
K i rchhoff,  B.A.  (1996),  Self-Employment  and  Dynamic  Capitalism,  Journal  of  Labor
Re s e a rc h 17, 627-643.
K i r z n e r, I.M. (1997), Entre p reneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An
Austrian Approach, Journal of Economic Litera t u re 35, 60-85.
Klomp,  L.  and  J.J.M.  Pronk  (1998),  Kennis  en  Economie  1998,  Vo o r b u rg  /  Heerlen:
Statistics Netherlands.
Ku z n e t s, S. (1971), Economic Growth of Nations, Total Output and Production Structure,
C a m b r i d g e, MA: Harva rd Unive rsity Press / Belknapp Pre s s.
L eve r,  M.H.C.  and  H.R.  Nieuwenhuijsen  (1999),  The  Impact  of  Competition  on
P roductivity in Dutch Manufacturing. In: D.B. Au d retsch and A.R. Thurik, I n n o v a t i o n ,
Industry Evolution and Employment, Cambridge: Cambridge Unive rsity Pre s s, (forthco-
m i n g ) .
L oveman, G. and W. Sengenberger (1991), The Re - e m e rgence of Small-Scale Pro d u c t i o n ;
an International Comparison, Small Business Economics 3, 1-37.
L u c a s, R.E. (1978), On the Size Distribution of Firms, BELL Journal of Economics 9, 50 8 -
5 2 3 .
M a s l ow, A.H. (1970), Motivation and Pe rs o n a l i t y, New York: Harper and Row.
5 3
L i t e r a t u r eM e redith, J. (1987), The Strategic Ad vantages of New Manufacturing Technologies for
Small Firms, S t rategic Management Journal 8, 249-258.
N i c kell, S.J. (1996), Competition and Corporate Pe r f o r m a n c e, Journal of Political Economy
104, 724-746.
N i c kell, S., P. Nicolitsas and N. Dryden (1997), What Makes Firms Perform Well? E u ro p e a n
Economic Re v i e w 41, 783-796.
Nolan,  P.  (1995), C h i n a ’s  Rise,  Ru s s i a ’s  Fall: Po l i t i c s,  Economics  and  Planning  in  the
Transition from Stalinism, New York: St Martin’s Pre s s.
Nooteboom, B, 1994, Innovation and Diffusion in Small Firms, Small Business Economics
6, 327-347.
OECD (1998), Fostering Entre p re n e u rs h i p, Pa r i s.
Oughton, C. and G. Whittam (1997), Competition and Cooperation in the Small Firm
S e c t o r, Scottish Journal of Political Economy 44, 1-30 .
P h i l l i p s, B.D. (1985), The Effect of Industry Deregulation on the Small Business Sector,
Business Economics 20, 28-37.
P i o re, M.J. and C.F. Sabel (1984), The Second Industrial Divide Possibilities for Pro s p e r i t y,
N ew York: Basic Books.
Po r t e r, M. E., 1990, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York: Free Pre s s.
Prusa, T.J. and J.A. Schmitz Jr. (1991), Are New Firms an Important Source of Innova t i o n ?
Evidence from the Softwa re Industry, Economics Letters 35, 339-342.
Ro t h well, R. (1983), Innovation and Firm Size: A Case for Dynamic Complementarity; Or,
Is Small Really So Beautiful? Journal of General Management 8, 5-25.
Ro t h well, R. (1984), The Role of Small Firms in the Emergence of New Te c h n o l o g i e s,
O M E GA 12, 19-29.
S c h a f f n e r, J.A. (1993), Rising Incomes and the Shift from Self-Employment to Firm-Based
P roduction, Economics Letters 41, 435-440.
S c h i l l e r, B.R. and P.E. Crewson (1997), Entre p reneurial Origins: A Longitudinal Inquiry,
Economic Inquiry 35, 523-531 .
Schmitz, J.A. Jr. (1989), Imitation, Entre p re n e u rship, and Long-Run Growth, Journal of
Political Economy 97, 721 - 7 3 9 .
Schultz,  T. P.  (1990),  Wo m e n ’s  Changing  Participation  in  the  Labor  Fo rce:  A  Wo r l d
Pe rs p e c t i ve, Economic Development and Cultural Change 38, 457-488.
S c h u m p e t e r, J.A. (1950), Capitalism, Socialism and Democra c y, New York: Harper and
Row.
S h e p h e rd, W.G. (1982), Causes of Increased Competition in the U.S. Economy, 1939-1980,
Review of Economics and Statistics 64, 613-626. 
S t o p f o rd,  J.M.  and  C.W. F.  Baden-Fuller  (1994),  Creating  Corporate  Entre p re n e u rs h i p ,
S t rategic Management Journal 15, 521 - 5 3 6 .
5 4
L i t e r a t u r eS t o rey, D.J. (1991), The Birth of New Enterprises - Does Unemployment Matter? A Rev i ew
of the Evidence, Small Business Economics 3, 167-178.
S t o rey, D.J. and B.S. Tether (1998), Public policy measures to support new technology-
based firms in the European Union, Re s e a rch Po l i c y 2 6 , 103 7 - 105 7 .
Thurik, A.R. (1996), Small Firms, Entre p re n e u rship and Economic Growth. In: Z.J. Ac s, B.
Carlsson and A.R. Thurik, Small Business in the Modern Economy, De Vries Lectures in
E c o n o m i c s, Blackwell Publishers (Oxford ) .
We n n e ke rs,  A.R.M.  and  A.R.  Thurik  (1999),  Linking  Entre p re n e u rship  and  Economic
G rowth, Small Business Economics, forthcoming.
Wildeman, R.E., G. Hofstede, N.G. Noord e r h aven, A.R. Thurik, W.H.J. Ve r h o even and
A.R.M. We n n e ke rs (1998), Culture ’s Role in Entre p re n e u rship; Self-employment out of
Dissatisfaction, Discussion Paper 9815, Ro t t e rdam Institute for Business Economic Studies,
E rasmus Unive rsity Ro t t e rd a m .
Wit, G. de and F. van Winden (1991), An M-sector, N-group Behav i o ral Model of Self-
E m p l oyment, Small Business Economics 3, 49-66.
Yamada,  G.  (1996),  Urban Informal Employment  and  Self-Employment  in  Deve l o p i n g
Countries: Theory and Evidence, Economic Development and Cultural Change 44, 289-31 4 .
5 5
L i t e r a t u r eAppendix I: Data
The following countries are in the estimation sample (1974-1994):
Au s t r i a G re e c e S p a i n U . S .
B e l g i u m I re l a n d Swe d e n J a p a n
D e n m a r k I t a l y U . K . C a n a d a
F i n l a n d L u xe m b o u rg I c e l a n d Au s t ra l i a
Fra n c e N e t h e r l a n d s N o r way N ew Zealand
G e r m a ny (We s t ) Po r t u g a l Sw i t z e r l a n d
The variable definitions and main sources are listed below.
1. E : self-employment or business ownership. This varia-
ble is defined as the number of self-employed (business
owners) per labor force, who in this report are defined to inclu-
de owners of enterprises that are not legally incorporated as
well as  owner/managers of incorporated businesses. We use
the terms self-employed and business owners interchangeably.
For more information on various measures of self-employment,
see The state of small business; a report of the president 1986,
Washington: US Government Printing Office, chapter 4. 
Data on the number of self-employed (business owners) are
from the OECD Labor Force Statistics 1974-1994. Some data
were missing however. EIM completed the data by using ratios
derived from other variables, which sometimes came from
other sources. Furthermore, EIM made a unified dataset of self-
employed persons, which was necessary as in the OECD statis-
tics the definitions of self-employed were not fully compatible
between countries. In some countries self-employed are strict-
ly defined as individuals owning a business that is not legally
incorporated. In other countries, owner/managers of an incor-
porated business who gain profits as well as a salary, are also
c o n s i d e red  self-employed.  Au s t ralia,  Canada,  Denmark,
Fra n c e,  Ireland,  the  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway,
Portugal, Spain and U.S. use the narrow definition, while the
other countries apply the broader characterization. For the
countries not following the broader definition, EIM made an
estimation of the number of owner/managers by using infor-
mation derived from statistical bureaux in these countries.
Another difference in definition is that in some countries
unpaid family workers are included in the data of self-employ-
ed as well. This is the case in Austria, Canada, Finland, France,
Greece, Italy and the Netherlands. The unpaid family workers
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other variables. Data on the labor force are also from the OECD
Labor Force Statistics 1974-1994. Again, some missing data
have been filled up from other sources.
2. Y/CAP : gross domestic product per capita. The underlying
variables gross domestic product and total population are from
OECD, National Accounts 1960-1994, Detailed Tables, and from
the OECD Labor Force Statistics 1974-1994, respectively. The
GDP is measured in constant prices. Furthermore, purchasing
power parities are used to make the monetary units compara-
ble between countries.
3. U : (standardized) unemployment rate. This variable
measures the number of unemployed as a fraction of the total
labor force. The labor force is formed by employees, self-
employed persons, unpaid family workers, people who work in
the army and unemployed persons. The main source for this
variable is OECD Main Economic Indicators. Some missing
data on the number of unemployed have been filled up with
help of data from the OECD Labor Force Statistics and the
Yearbook of Labor Statistics from the International Labor
Office.
4. LIQ : labor income quote. The following definition is used.
Total  compensation  of  employees  is  multiplied  by  (total
employment/number of employees) to correct for the imputed
wage income for the self-employed persons. Next, the number
obtained is divided by total income (compensation of employ-
ees plus other income). The data on the separate variables are
from the OECD, National Accounts 1960-1994, Detailed Tables.
Some missing data have been filled up with help of data from
the OECD Labor Force Statistics.
5. Y : gross domestic product. This is the same variable as
the Y part of the variable Y/CAP (see 2.).
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Appendix I: DataAppendix II: Weighed re g re s s i o n s
Estimation results are obtained by weighing the observations with
the number of self-employed. In this appendix the reasons for doing
so will be explained. For simplicity we will assume that we have
c ross-section data (i.e., without time-dimension).
Suppose that there are N regions in L countries with L << N. In our
c a s e, L would be 23 because we have 23 countries in our data set. We
assume that these N regions are all of the same size. Thus, for exa m-
p l e, the U.S. would have many more regions than Luxe m b o u rg. If we
would dispose of data per region, we would propose the follow i n g
model for a linear relationship between two variables x and y:
(a) 
The subscript R is used to denote that the data are assumed to be
available at the re g i o n s - l evel. The OLS-estimator of b in (a) is then
H oweve r, we have data at the aggregation level of countries and not
at the level of re g i o n s. Given our assumption that the regions are
equally larg e, we can write the model with the variables x and y at
the country level (subscript c) as 
(b) 
and where we define the variable Di , j as follows: Di,j = 1 if region i
lies  in  country  j  and  0  otherwise.  Fu r t h e r m o re,  Nj d e n o t e s
the number of regions in country j (          ). Hence, we assume 
that the variables x and y at the country-level can be written as the
ave rages of the variables over the regions of the country. When we
t ranslate these country-level variables yC , j and xC , j f rom (b) back to
the re g i o n s - l evel variables yR,i and xR,i f rom (a), we obtain the fol-
l owing observations for our original model (a) at the re g i o n s - l eve l :
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Di , L = 1: yR , i* = yC,L,  xR , i* = xC , L , ( NL o b s e r va t i o n s ) .
Writing the data at the re g i o n s - l evel in this manner, it is implicitly
assumed  that  w i t h i n c o u n t r i e s,  the  various  regions  are  identical.
With these observa t i o n s, the OLS-estimator can be written as:
T h u s, here it is assumed that there are N observations where for
every observation (region) within a country, the variables have iden-
tical va l u e s.
H oweve r, we have only L observations and then the OLS-estimator
of b from (b) reads as
We see that this  estimator is different from b*O L S (a),  which we
would like to have. The estimator bO L S (b) does not take account that
d i f f e rent countries have different numbers of re g i o n s, or stated dif-
f e re n t l y, that the various countries are not equally larg e. There f o re,
we weigh the observations by premultiplying the variables xC and yC
f rom (b) with the square root of the number of re g i o n s. When we do
that the (weighed) least squares estimator bW L S (b) reads as
We see that the WLS-estimator of (b) is exactly the same as the OLS-
estimator of (a), b*O L S (a). Clearly, we do not know the number of
regions per country. We use the number of self-employed as a prox y
for this number of re g i o n s.
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In  the  paper  Full  Information  Maximum  Likelihood  (FIML)  is
applied. This method generates parameter estimates by maximizing
an objective function. This is done in an itera t i ve pro c e s s. The FIML
p ro c e d u re might stop while the global maximum of the objective
function has not been reached yet. A disadvantage of the method is
that it is sometimes not clear whether or not the FIML pro c e d u re
found the ‘real’ parameter estimates, i.e., whether the global maxi-
mum was found. There f o re, we also applied an alternative method
to find the parameter values of our basic model (3). Instead of esti-
mating the model simultaneously, we estimated the model sequen-
t i a l l y. 
This second method is implemented as follows. First, we estimate
equation (3a) with weighed least squares (weighing variable is the
number of self-employed, as before). On the basis of the para m e t e r
values found for the equilibrium rate of self-employment we then
calculate the deviation variable which is used in (3b) and using this
variable we then estimate equation (3b), again with weighed least
s q u a re s. Because the residuals of equations (3a) and (3b) are hard l y
c o r related (we  found  a correlation  coefficient  of  0.025), we  may
expect that the parameter estimates of the single equation estima-
tions will not differ considerably from the ‘simultaneous’ estimates
of (3). There f o re, if the single equations estimates indeed appear to
be  approximately  the  same  as  the  ‘simultaneous’  estimates,  this
would enhance our confidence in the reliability of the ‘simultaneous’
e s t i m a t e s. Notice that this approach would not be possible if model
(3) would be intrinsically simultaneous.
We start the implementation of the two-step method by estimating
equation (3a). Looking at equation (3a) howeve r, we see that the
model is not identified when we estimate this as a single equation:
the para m e t e rs b0 and a can not be estimated separa t e l y. There f o re
we estimate the following equation:
( 7 a )
It can be shown that the following relations hold between the para-
m e t e rs from (3a) and the para m e t e rs from (7a).
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lagged va r i a b l e s, see (7a)). The results of the single equation esti-
mation of (7a) are in table 9a. In this table also the implied para m e-
ter values of (3a) are reported. To compare them with the ‘simulta-
neous’ equation estimates we also report them in the last column
(see also table 3).
Table 9a E s t i ma t ion results (7a)*, **
Pa ra meters (7a) E s t i ma t e Pa ra meters (3a) I m p l ied value (7a) Value (3a)
a0 . 0 8 7 a . 4 9 . 4 6
( 6 . 2 )
a1 . 8 8 b0 . 1 2 . 1 3
( 3 5 . 9 )
a2 . 0 7 6 b1 . 0 7 6 . 0 7 8
( 5 . 4 )
a3 - . 0 3 7 b2 - . 0 3 7 - . 0 3 6
( - 2 . 8 )
a4 - . 0 0 5 1 b - . 0 4 2 - . 0 3 9
( - 5 . 4 )
a5 . 0 0 0 1 4 g . 0 0 1 1 . 0 0 1 0
( 4 . 5 )
a6 . 0 1 1 d0 , I TA . 0 1 1 . 0 1 1
( 5 . 1 )
* t-values are between pare nt he s e s.
* * All reported estima t io ns were run with 184 observatio ns.
From table 9a we see that the para m e t e rs of the business ow n e rs h i p
equation  (fifth  column)  from  the  ‘simultaneous’  two  equations
model are about the same as the implied parameter values from the
single equation (fourth column). Using the implied parameter va l u e s
f rom the fourth column we calculate the deviation variable that we
need in the growth equation, as follows: E_devi t = (.49 -.042 Y/CAPi t
+ .0011 (Y/CAP)i t
2 - Ei t)
2. The following equation is estimated using
weighed least square s :
( 7 b )
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(7b) as well as the ‘simultaneous’ model results of (3b).
Table 9b E s t i ma t ion results (7b)*, **
Pa ra meters (7b) E s t i ma t e Pa ra meters (3b) Value (3b)
b0 . 1 8 d1 . 1 8
( 8 . 9 )
b1 - 3 . 1 8 c0 - 3 . 6 6
( - 2 . 2 )
b2 - . 2 0 c1 - . 2 0
( - 2 . 6 )
b3 - . 0 0 3 2 c2 - . 0 0 3 1
( - 3 . 0 )
* t-values are between pare nt he s e s.
* * All reported estima t io ns were run with 184 observatio ns.
From table 9b we see that also for the growth equation, the single
equation estimation and the ‘simultaneous’ estimation yield almost
identical re s u l t s.
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